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ABSTRACT
Before unification in 1990, Germany experienced a rise
in right-wing violence and political popularity. The trend
has continued until the present. Many scholars attribute
the phenomenon to the economic and social impact of
unification and the wave of immigrants pouring into Germany.
This is only partly true. Since the trend began before
unification, then the real roots lie somewhere else.
This thesis suggests that the rise in right-wing
extremism is linked to the growing pressures of post-
industrialization. Changes in modes of production, further
globalization of economies, the information explosion, and
the mobility of the world's capital, are causing new
opportunities and dangers for people. Lost jobs or pay cuts
are resulting in the West from the move to robotics, and
from businesses heading for cheaper labor markets. Germany
is not alone in facing these challenges. Most Western
states are confronting the same problems. However,
Germany's Nazi past make it seem very different.
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The rise of the German right wing movement as a
phenomenon preceded and superseded German reunification.
Its true roots lie in economic, social, and political
changes common in most post-industrial societies, and its
modern-day incarnation has been detectable in Germany since
the mid 1980s. This thesis will suggest that the extreme
right-wing has steadily gained popularity well before
reunification. Though the end of the Cold War, the collapse
of communism in eastern Europe, and the reunification of
Germany have all contributed to economic, social, and
political problems in Germany, these are not the sole
sources of this problem.
Germany is not alone in experiencing a rise in
nationalism, and right-wing extremism. France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States face similar issues, as do
several other European states. What makes Germany's
troubles appear unique? What is the common element of state
and society in all post-industrial societies? Gaining
insight and possible answers to these questions of nation
and politics is the purpose of this thesis.
It is crucial to identify properly the causes of German
right-wing popularity and to identify the active dangers
from the imagined perils. False perceptions about the
1
rimpact of unification can misdirect external focus and
attention from the real causes and problems that Europe must
address. Unification since 1990 itself has not brought
about all of Germany's woes. Rather, it has exacerbated
other symptoms that many western societies are experiencing.
For instance, the West's developed states are all undergoing
an economic transformation from manufacturing to high
technology and services. Just as the Industrial Revolution
in the nineteenth century created a great social upheaval,
so does the current post-modern revolution. The social
dislocations caused by economic change result in
dissatisfaction with politics as usual, and xenophobia.
When certain people feel that the political and social
system does not work for them, or become anxious about their
economic security, they are susceptible to political
extremes. Germans of today are no different from Americans
in this regard. Unfortunately, Germany is being hit with an
economic revolution at the same time that reunification and
massive immigration from the east take place. These
additional burdens, coupled with the historical legacy of
the Nazi era, are monumental problems for any democracy to
overcome, and they are the elements which make Germany's
troubles seem unique.
The conservative right and the extreme right-wing have
experienced a surge in popularity and political support
since 1988. The focus of many scholars and journalists has
2
been on the connection between the reunification of Germany
in October 1990 and the rise of militant right-wing
violence. The common argument suggests that unification and
the collapse of communism in the east, which have led to
widespread immigration, are the sources of all of Germany's
troubles. The economic costs of unification and the flood
of immigrants have soured the early euphoria over
reunification. Since the extreme right-wing plays on the
public's fears of being "overrun" by foreigners, and losing
German prosperity, and has gained in popularity, then it is
assumed, this must be at the root of the far right's recent
success. However, Germany's economy was in decline before
unification, and the right wing was gaining in popularity
since the mid 1980s due to dislocations caused, in part, by
the common post-industrial economic transformation.
Before the end of the Cold War and German reunification,
there existed a West Germany and an East Germany. Two very
different states whose orientation was true to their titles,
west and east. Now that Germany is united, the new state
finds it is no longer a western state nor an eastern state,
but rather a central power once again. Germany's role in
central Europe was an important and dominating one before
the end of the Second World War. As the bridge between east
and west, Germany is resuming its pivotal position in the
3
rregion. 1 This is taking some time, for Germany's political
system was not prepared to deal with the sudden historic
changes of 1989, and the subsequent collapse of communism to
the east, or the unexpected reunification.
Immigrants have poured into Germany because of the
formerly liberal immigration laws and the relative economic
prosperity of Germany, not to mention the war in the
Balkans. Perhaps more important, however, many refugees
from the east seek Germany because it is the first
prosperous state they reach. The impact of geography cannot
be overstated. Germany's interest in maintaining stability
in eastern Europe is a vital national security issue. The
ramifications of instability and war are massive migrations
of people into Germany.
Those equipped with a better perspective on the nature
of Germany's dilemmas can best understand the momentous
social and political changes affecting the Western world.
Misunderstandings can lead to the possible political
isolation of Germany in a time when Germany needs support
from its allies. Germany cannot solve all of its problems
alone. In order to avoid over generalizations and false
historical analogies, one must look in depth at these issues
facing Germany in the past and present.
lWolf Gruner, "Germany in Europe," in The State of Germany,
ed. John Breuilly (New York: Longman Publishing, 1992), p. 57.
4
rThe last one hundred years of German political history
give a clear picture of a people and society struggling with
the forces of modernity. There is an unmistakable line of
continuity. Each major event helps explain how Germany has
arrived where it is today. Underneath the surface of these
momentous events, however, were the slow developing forces
of change, much like the seismic frictions beneath the
earth, building to the point that the pressure is so great
that there is a cataclysmic release of energy which in a
moment can change the entire landscape.
Imperial Germany (1871-1918) faced a multitude of
social, economic, and political problems associated with
rapid industrialization. The old monarchial political
institutions proved ill-suited to the demands of modern
society. The domestic political crisis contributed to the
foreign policy actions of Germany, pushing the Reich into
the First World War. Defeat added new burdens to Germany's
still unresolved political crisis. When the worst
depression in modern times hit in 1929, the seeds of radical
nationalism sprouted. The determined and opportunistic
Adolf Hitler gained power in the process.
The destruction of the Nazi regime ushered in a new
international order, and left Germany divided. Not until
the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, was
Germany given a second chance at nation-building. The
difficulties of assimilating two divergent cultures will
5
concern Germany for years to come. Unfortunately, this
process obscures the structural problems in West German
society before unification.
Today, western society confronts the challenges of a
second industrial revolution. Post-industrialization is as
unrelenting in its disruption of the social fabric of states
as the Industrial Revolution of 1750-1900. Where
authoritarianism proved incapable of dealing with monumental
change, will democracy fair any better?
Before exploring German political developments,
important terms, such as nationalism, right-wing extremism,
and conservatism, must first be defined. Nationalism has
assumed many forms during the course of history. In the
late 1800s it stressed loyalty and patriotism to ones ethnic
community. It placed one's nation and culture above others.
More radical elements of nationalism added racism and Social
Darwinism, espousing a struggle of nations with only the
strongest surviving. The ugly side of nationalism
rationalized the de-humanization and murder of people
considered unfit for the "master race during the Third
Reich, 1933-1945."
After the destruction and misery of the Second World
War, all forms of nationalism were discredited. The once
powerful mass appeal of nationalism was lost, with only
small groups of revisionists still clinging to the ideals.
Today, the number of people flocking to the banner of
6
nationalism is once again on the rise. The horrible
memories of the war are fading. The young are finding some
appeal in the ideas of nationalism in a complex world of
growing internationalism. Perhaps this is a normal backlash
to the progress of the European political integration.
Conservatism embraces the status-quo and traditions.
Maintaining order and stability are primary objectives. In
nineteenth century Germany, the conservative elites were the
ruling class, their power being derived from their vast
estates. The prevailing political order was only an
advanced form of the feudal world. Once the Empire fell in
1918, the traditional forces became reactionary, seeking a
return to the old regime. Conservatives today represent a
wide cross section of German society. The once fairly
homogeneous political spectrum has fractured, with
progressive conservatism, ultra-conservatism, and status-quo
conservatism being the main focal points.
The right-wing of politics begins with the ultra-
conservatives wanting to return to the old order. The far
right and right-wing extremists have different agendas, yet
both favor some form of authoritarian rule. The more
extreme elements favor a return of National Socialism,
seeking to destroy democracy and class structures in favor
of the national community. A blend of extreme nationalism
and socialism, National Socialism, returns to the ideas of
7
racial superiority, yet sees the necessity in restructuring
society in order to win in the struggle of nations.
In order to appreciate how nationalism has helped shape
German political developments in the past and present, one
must look at its beginnings. An historical look at the path
of German nationalism helps explain most Germans' uneasiness
with the entire concept, especially when connected with
racism. Those on the extreme right are trying to rewrite
the history books; hoping to rehabilitate the Third Reich
and the terrible consequences of its twisting of
nationalism. The only defense to these attempts is an
educated public awareness to the truth.
8
II. THE RISE OF RADICAL NATIONALISM: 1871-1918
The demise of the Holy Roman Empire with its structures
swept away by "the forces of war and revolution," namely the
French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, cleared the way
for the German nation state. 2 James Sheehan states:
The story of the revolutionary period took on a significance
of its own, important less for what happened than for what
people thought had happened. In memoirs, history books,
novels, and paintings, the 'wars of liberation' were shaped to
fit an unfolding narrative of nation-building, in which the
Volk's historic rising became at once the prologue and
precondition of the nation's ultimate triumph. 3
Hajo Holborn aptly summarizes the progression between
feudalism and the Industrial Revolution:
Metternich and the statesmen of the Germanic Confederation had
succeeded in subduing the political movements of the French
Revolution. But the political ideas of the French Revolution
had been only one aspect of the broad process of social
transformation from feudalism to a bourgeois society, and this
transformation was not brought to standstill by the political
victories of the rulers of restoration. 4
The cooperation and "solidarity" between the monarchial
forces of the Prussian, Austrian, and Russian, Empires,
which had successfully repressed the 1848-49 revolutions,
2James Sheehan, "State and Nationality in the Napoleonic
Period," in The State of Bermany, p. 57.
3Ibid, p. 58.
4Halo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany, 1840-1945, (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1969, ninth reprint 1975), p. 3.
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became strained by the Crimean War in 1854-55. 5
The old international order was giving way at the same
time that the internal social and political structures of
central and eastern Europe were under severe strain.
Bismarck managed to keep the forces of change in check while
he was in power. His elaborate secret alliances also kept
the European peace after 1871. When he stepped down in
1890, however, it was as if the international and internal
system were collapsing simultaneously. The true nature of
the Bismarckian order was the skillful holding action of the
"Iron Chancellor," who offered false hopes for future
change. Unwilling to reform the political institutions,
Bismarck relied on exhortations of national duty to keep the
system going. In the end Bismarck did more harm to Germany
than many appreciate. He built false hopes for the
conservative elites to maintain their power, and he gave the
masses false expectations of change.
A. A NEW NATION IS BORN
The conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War, in 1871,
brought the second German Empire. The fall of Napoleon III
and the French Empire removed the final obstacle to the
advent of Kleindeutsches Reich. In place of dozens of small
5William Carr, "The Unification of Germany," in The State of
Germany, p. 83.
(Also see) Norman Rich, Why the Crimean War?, (Hanover:
University Press of New England, 1985)
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and large principalities, a new powerful state emerged,
altering the balance of power in Europe that had existed
since 1648. (Rebuilt in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars)6
Stretching from the Masurian Lakes in East Prussia to the
Rhine river and the Ruhr Valley, from the North Atlantic and
Baltic sea coasts to the Bavarian Alps in the south, stood a
diverse, resource-rich country of fifty million people. 7
The architect of this second Empire was the Prussian
Minister President, Prince Otto von Bismarck. Through
diplomacy and quick, decisive wars, Bismarck excluded
Austria and France from southern Germany, and built a
federated Empire on Prussian terms. For Bismarck and many
Prussian conservatives, it was important to establish a
Germany dominated by Prussia instead of a German
Confederation which dominated Prussia. Consequently,
Germany's constitution favored the interests of Prussia's
agrarian elite's, and made any future changes to the
constitution impossible without Prussian support. 8
Before the end of the Napoleonic Wars, there existed
competing ideas for the creation of a German nation state.
6Gordan A. Craig, Europe Since 1815, (San Diego: Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich College PUblishers, 1961; reprint ed., 1974),
pp. 13-17.
7Volker R. Berghahn, Modern Germany: Society, Economy and
Politics in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge
university Press, 1987), p. 3.
8Gordon A. Craig, Germany, 1866-1945, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1978), p. 39.
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Some people favored the loose federation of all German
princely states into a new Holy Roman Empire. Others wanted
a more centralized state that included all German speaking
peoples. There were also variations that included or
excluded either Prussia or Austria. Of course, there were
those who simply wanted to continue with the status quo. 9
The National Liberals of Germany, a party of
intellectuals, middle class businessmen and professionals,
sought the formation of a strong state that included
Prussia, but excluded the Hapsburg Austria. Founded on
liberal principles with a parliamentary government
controlling most functions of state, Germany would have
looked more like Great Britain than Prussia, if the National
Liberals had had their way.l0 Bismarck foiled these
aspirations. Diplomatic maneuvering and military victories,
from 1864 to 1871, allowed Bismarck to enlist National
Liberal support for his plans to build a new state. 11
Nonetheless, certain liberals remained hopeful that
constitutional reform would be possible in the near future.
As a consequence of the way the new nation state was
formed, particular interests of the German states endured.
9John Breuilly, ed., The State of Germany, (New York:
Longman Publishing, 1992), pp. 3-11.
lOGeoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right, (Yale Universi ty,
1980; reprint ed., Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1991),
pp. 19-40. and Craig, Germany, pp. 61-100.
llBrian Bond, War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 13-39.
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For example, in order to persuade the Wittelsbach dynasty of
Bavaria to join the new Empire, Bismarck had to make major
concessions and accord privileges. Bavaria remained exempt
from taxes on beer and spirits, retained control of postal
services, railroads, the right to collect taxes, and its
army during peacetime. 12 Other states gained concessions
depending on their size and influence. Bismarck allowed
these states more autonomy, for his constitution also gave
the largest state, Prussia, more leverage in the dualistic
mechanisms of the Prussian constitution and statecraft.
B. POLITICAL STRUCTURES
Gordon Craig has described the essence of the German
constitution best:
The basic purpose of the constitution, in short, was to create
the institutions for a national state that would be able to
compete effectively with the most powerful of its neighbors,
without, however, sacrificing, or even limiting, the
aristocratic-monarchial order of the pre-national period.
This task invited complication, and it was in fact achieved at
the price of ambiguities and contradictions that were always
awkward and, as the years passed, invested German
parliamentary life, and politics in general, with an
increasing amount of friction and frustration. 13
The new German state structure consisted of two legislative
bodies. The upper House (Bundesrat) consisted of appointed
delegates from the twenty-two princely states and three free
cities. 14 Any changes to the constitution and all
12Craig, Germany, p. 41.
13Ibid, p. 39.
14Berghahn, Modern Germany, p. 20.
13
legislation had to pass through this house before being sent
to the lower House (Reichstag). To ensure that the
constitution would respect Prussia's agrarian conservative
interests, the authors of Article 78 of the Constitution
stipulated that any such legislation would be defeated if
fourteen votes were cast against it. With seventeen votes,
Prussia held the most votes in the Bundesrat. 15
The Reichstag seats were filled by nationwide elections.
Universal suffrage by secret ballot for all German males
twenty-five or older made the elections seem modern and fair
by the standards of the day.16 The system, however, was
designed to favor the rural landed interests, rather than
the liberal, socialist-inclined cities. Seats were awarded
to electoral districts of varying size, without regard to
population. Consequently, sparsely populated east Prussian
estates could muster more conservative seats than the
densely populated, industrial centers of the Ruhr. 17 This
asymmetry remained central to the political culture of the
second Reich and the first Republic.
Members of the Reichstag were not voted into their
seats. Instead, the parties received seats according to the
15Ibid.
16Craig, Germany, p. 45.
17Brett Fairbairn, "Interpreting Wilhelmine Elections:
National Issues, Fairness Issues, and Electoral Mobilization," in
Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germ1ny,
ed. Larry E. Jones, and James Retallack (Washington D.C.:




,election results and then filled these positions with people
of their choice, according to party lists. As a result
personal accountability to the electorate did not exist.
The Reichstag wielded limited power. It did not posses the
power to initiate legislation, but could only act on bills
submitted to it from the government. Though the Reichstag
did control the funds, it never used this power to its full
benefit. One reason maybe that the Kaiser could dissolve
the Reichstag if an impasse developed between government and
parliament, and call for new elections. The constitution
did stipulate that elections could not be postponed. 18
On paper, the Kaiser held the greatest power. All
government ministers were appointed by the Kaiser, including
the Chancellor, who was responsible for the administration
of state and foreign policy. In addition, the Army answered
only to the Emperor. The role of personalities was
decisive. Bismarck wrote the constitution to favor his
position as Chancellor under Emperor Wilhelm I, who, for the
most part, allowed Bismarck to run the state and foreign
policy as he generally saw fit. Though the Army remained
outside the Chancellor's reach, Bismarck's influence on the
aging Monarch was great indeed.
Under altered circumstances, after 1888, with different
personalities in power, Bismarck's system faltered. The
young, energetic Wilhelm II sought to change the course of
18Craig, Germany, pp. 38-60.
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Germany's foreign po1icy.19 This development eventually led
to Bismarck's retirement in 1890. Wilhelm replaced Bismarck
with men whom he believed he could control. Germany's
foreign policy thereafter suffered immensely from lack of
continuity or cohesion. The army planned for a European war
ignoring the possible diplomatic considerations. The
Chancellor and the Foreign Office were never consulted or
involved in the making of the war plans. 20 This would have
disastrous effects in 1914.
After Bismarck's retirement in 1890, Germany had four
Chancellors before the First World War: Caprivi, Hohenlohe,
Buelow, and Bethman-Hollweg. 21 All faced the difficult
problem of reconciling the Kaiser's wishes with the growing
pressure for domestic reform on a wide range of issues, from
taxation to elections. Answerable to the Kaiser, yet
constantly under attack from the Reichstag, these men turned
to foreign policy to divert attention from growing domestic
problems. Buelow, Chancellor from 1900-1909, stated in a
letter; "I am putting the main emphasis on foreign policy,
only a successful foreign policy can reconcile, pacify,
19George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European
Order, Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890, (Princeton: Princeton
university Press, 1979, latest reprint ed., 1989), pp. 368-370.
20Arthur Rosenberg, The Birth of the German Republic, 1871-
1918, translated by Ian F. D. Morrow (New York: Russel & Russel
Inc., 1962, first published in German, 1931), pp. 67-68.
21Craig, Germany, pp. 224-338.
16
,rally, unite."22 Due to the Kaiser's meddling, however,
foreign policy only became a source of conflict between the
conservative elites and the rising radical nationalistic
pressure groups, dissatisfied with failures abroad.
Even with the internal social crisis mounting, the
conservative forces opposing political change were strong
and well established. Two of the crucial pillars of the
monarchial order were the Prussian Army and the Church. The
Prussian Army managed to survive the attempts of
Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau to subject it to the people's
will. 23 Officered primarily by the nobility, the Prussian,
and later German Army, was committed to maintaining the old
order. The stunning victories over the Austrians and the
French in the Wars of Unification, 1866-1871, elevated the
Army to a cult status. The officers from the middle class,
who held important positions in logistics and staff work,
were heavily indoctrinated into supporting the Army and
Monarchy.
Religion played a decisive role in German society.
There was no division of state and church. The Catholic and
Protestant churches both emerged as powerful forces in body
politic. At the insistence of the crown, the Protestant
22Katherine Lerman, "Bismarck's Heir: Chancellor Bernhard
von Buelow and the National Idea, 1890-1918," in The State of
Germany, p. 83.
23Gordan A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-
1945, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 37-81.
17
church tended to avoid pressing social issues to support the
status quo instead as the state church in Prussia. 24 The
Catholic church was the bulwark against Prussian domination,
with its own political party, the 'Centre Party, which acted
as a mouthpiece for its concerns and interests. Politicized
religion also helped preserve the sectional differences of
Germany. Southern and western Germany were predominately
Catholic, whereas Northern Germany was mainly Protestant.
The Thirty Years War, 1618-1648, left most of Central
Europe traumatized. 25 The death, destruction and insecurity
caused it had formed strong regional bonds. Because fears
of religious persecution persisted, the Catholic south was
determined in keeping the federation as weak as possible.
Bismarck's attempts to break the political power of the
Catholic church backfired, uniting the Catholic community
more than ever. 26 This religious division would continue to
politically haunt the Empire and the Republic after 1918.
C. FORCES OF CHANGE, 1890-1918
In the mere twenty years after German unification,
industrialization rapidly transformed the country. The
period of 1890 to 1913 witnessed the greatest changes.
24Craig, Germany, p. 180.
25Gordan A. Craig, The Germans, (New York: Penguin Books,
1982, second reprint 1991), pp. 16-21.
26Halo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany, p. 262-266.
18
,Volker Berghahn states:
The development of modern Germany is best understood against
the background of the Industrial Revolution which affected
Central Europe with full force in the final decades of the
nineteenth century. Britain had experienced the blessings and
the traumas of industrialization earlier and more slowly, but
nowhere else in Europe did the transition from an economy
based on agriculture to one dominated by industry occur with
the same rapidity as in Germany.27
In 1890 Germany produced 4.1 million tons of pig-iron; by
1913, this had jumped to 17.6 million tons of steel,
compared to Great Britain with 8.0 million tons of pig-iron
in 1890 and 7.7 million tons of steel in 1913. 28 Germany's
relative share of world manufacturing also grew at a
phenomenal rate. In 1880 Germany claimed 8.5 percent of the
world's manufacturing, compared to Great Britain's of 22.9
percent. By 1913, Germany's share had grown to 14.8
percent, while Britain's declined to 13.6 percent. 29 The
United States was the only other country in the world to
witness similar growth rates during this period.
The Industrial Revolution also fueled a population
explosion. Between 1890 and 1913, Germany added seventeen
million people to its population, the greatest increase of
all European countries except Russia. 30 Population
demographics also changed drastically. During this same
27Berghahn, Modern Germany, p. 1.
28paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, (New




period Germany's urban population nearly tripled. 31 The
social ramifications of this industrial and population
transformation were enormous. Skilled artisans and
craftsmen found themselves competing against mass
production. The established middle class felt threatened by
the political agitation of the working class. Conservative
elites feared the loss of power and status in an ever faster
changing world.
In an extremely class conscious society the danger of
losing social position fractured an already divided country.
The government worsened this situation with its commitment
to the monarchial order. The rise of mass politics would
-
also upset the traditional political order, overshadowing
the moderate and liberal voices of incremental change. New,
more radical parties demanded immediate reforms, having no
patience for the old political process they viewed with
contempt. This collision between old and new is where
radical nationalism emerges.
D. POLITICAL PARTIES
By 1890, Germany's regional, political, social, and
confessional differences were still as strong as when the
Empire was founded. Many Bavarians considered Prussians
overly militaristic and authoritarian, while certain
Prussians tended to perceive Bavarians as soft and
31Ibid, p. 200.
20
unreliable. The political parties of the day reflected this
sectionalism. The Centre Party held the most seats in the
,Reichstag in 1890 with 106 out of a total of 397. 32 A
predominately Catholic party, the Centre catered to Catholic
interests and had its basis of support in southern Germany,
primarily Bavaria. Due to Bismarck's ill conceived
government attack on the Catholics in the 1870s
(Kulturkampf), the Catholic community felt threatened by the
Protestant north and militaristic Prussia. 33 Consequently,
they joined together, committed against a stronger central
government.
The National Liberals represented the interests of a
wide range of society, from industrialists to workers, from
farmers to artisans. 34 Notables, members of professions and
non-nobility, filled the positions of importance in the
party, appointing from within, and keeping voices of change
outside. The Party's main platform, the creation of a
liberal German state, lost momentum with Bismarck's military
successes. Many National Liberals supported Bismarck,
believing that reforms could be instituted in time, until he
turned on them in 1879. By 1890, the National Liberals were
in decline. Reichstag seats plummeted from ninety-nine in
32Eley, Reshaping the German Right, p. 365.
33Craig, Germany, p. 75.
34Karl Rohe, ed., Elections, Parties and Political
Traditions, Social Foundations of German Parties and Party
Systems, 1867-1987, (New York: Berg Publishers Ltd, 1990), p. 39.
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1887 to forty-two in 1890. 35 In a period of increasing
political polarization, the party's once diverse support
turned to other more modern parties. The lack of a coherent
platform and the leadership of an old guard of Notables who
were slow to change, also contributed to the party's
decline. The National Liberals also failed to exploit the
new opportunities of mass media in building popular support.
This would have fateful consequences for the liberal ideals
until 1945.
The Social Democratic Party proved to be the most
successful in its electoral support between 1890 and 1912.
Changing demographics, from rural to urban, led by increased
industrialization and a population explosion, contributed to
growing social tensions between those doing well and those
feeling oppressed or disoriented. The working class in
general perceived big business and the wealthy as
exploiters. Until labor unions became stronger and labor
reforms were enacted, this was generally true. The Social
Democratic Party (SPD) represented the working class. In
1890 the Social Democrats won thirty-five seats in the
Reichstag, twenty-four more than 1887. 36 By 1912 the SPD
became the single most powerful party in the Reichstag with
110 out of 397 seats. 37 The actual number of votes was much




higher, but the electoral districts favored the rural areas
over the cities. The SPD received most of its support from
the large industrial centers.
The Conservative Bloc consisted of basically two
parties: the German Conservative Party, and the Free
Conservative Party or Reich Party.38 Political support came
from the land owners, heavy industry, state bureaucrats, and
the military. Slow to adapt to the emerging world of mass
politics, the Conservative Bloc suffered as much as the
National Liberals by 1912. In 1890 the Conservatives gained
twenty-six seats less than in 1887. 39 The 1912 election
left the entire Conservative Bloc with only fifty-seven
seats, down from ninety-three seats in 1890. 40 This trend
would provoke a panic in the political right.
There were other political parties during this period.
Most represented narrow interests and only played a marginal
role. Minority parties of Poles, Danes, Alsatians, and
Lorrainers had a combined total of twenty-seven seats in
1890. 41 They would gain one seat by 1912. Anti-semitic
parties and other particularists went from seven seats in
1890 to thirty-three in 1908, and back down to nineteen in
38Rohe, Elections, Parties and Political Traditions, pp. 40-
41.
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1912. 42 These parties represented the fringe element of
German politics, yet their racist ideas would find fertile
ground in the bewildered postwar Germany, looking for
scapegoats.
The Left Liberals were not as marginal, yet saw their
position eroded in time. From a high of seventy-six seats
in 1890 to a low forty-two in 1912, the Left Liberals
mirrored the decline of the National Liberals and the
Conservatives. 43 The only parties to have substantial
numbers of seats in the Reichstag in 1912 were the Centre
Party with ninety-one, and the Social Democratic Party at
110 out of a total of 397. 44
The Social Democrats were not as powerful as their
number of seats would suggest. Their radical Marxist,
socialist agenda put them at odds with nearly all other
parties. The Centre Party gained the most from the fears of
socialism. With a steady showing in the elections, the
Centre became the leader in forming coalitions which could
overcome the factionalism of the Reichstag, and pass
legislation. The government, conservatives, and national
pressure groups feared that socialism would win unless





E. TRANSFORMATION OF THE RIGHT
The 1890s saw a rise in the number of national pressure
groups and memberships. The Pan German League, Colonial
Society, Navy League, and later the Defense League, were the
major organizations. All groups espoused patriotism and
nation before all. There existed a strong dislike for
political compromises on issues viewed as of national
importance. Contempt for the Reichstag dominated in the
minds of many members and leaders. In the beginning all of
these organizations strongly supported the government and
monarchy.
In the early stages, pressure groups viewed their
primary role as educational, covering such important issues,
as colonies, a stronger navy, or the preservation of German
culture. The government rarely received any criticism from
the national pressure groups. Many people saw their mission
as the protection of the establishment from the growing
dangers of the left. If the average worker could be taught
the importance of nationalism, a strong navy, and imperial
ambitions, then he could be saved from the radical left.
The national pressure groups launched active campaigns of
education and propaganda. However, most members of these
agitational organizations were from the middle class.
Such events as the Boer War, the Daily Telegraph Affair
of 1908, and the Moroccan Crisis of 1911, worked to push the
national pressure groups into opposition to government
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policies. 45 After Bismarck's retirement, Germany's
diplomatic situation deteriorated. Russia and France signed
a formal treaty of alliance in 1894. France and Britain
moved closer together with an "Entente Cordiale" in 1904,
resolving their colonial disagreements. 46 Germany appeared
to be encircled. These foreign policy failures were
attributed, in part, to the Kaiser's dabbling in areas which
should have been left to the Chancellor's office. The
growing threat from the left was also blamed on government
ineptitude. What had been tacit support or "accommodation"
of the conservative elites by the middle class, became open
antagonism on the eve of the First World War. This
situation only splintered the political scene further in
Germany, making any consensus building nearly impossible.
As the nation's wealth became less dependent on
agriculture, the political system's bias towards landed
interests came under assault. Tax exemptions and tariffs
which benefited the gentry caused agitation among the
growing middle class, which had become politically conscious
due to the rise of mass media. Most taxes fell dis-
proportionately on the middle class. Yet, the middle class
remained fractured on several issues, as well as along
regional and confessional lines. The power of the pressure
groups came from their appeal to broad national issues. By
45Ibid, p. 364.
46Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, p. 283.
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claiming goals greater than petty sectionalism, these groups
set out to "save" the country from perceived internal and
external enemies.
The national pressure groups departed from their
educational tradition to focus instead on mobilizing
political support for the conservatives during the 1907
campaign. This step led to a temporary defeat of the Social
Democrats. Co-opted by the government and conservative
elites to fend off the left, the government soon found it
difficult to accommodate the growing demands of the radical
right.
The conservative right had always feared extreme
nationalism. The thought of masses of people being
mobilized for a cause which could get out of control was
unnerving. Bismarck had used nationalistic appeals and
exhortations effectively. Others tried to emulate his
successes. Thus, the conservative right appealed to a sense
of duty, loyalty and pride as a political weapon against the
growing radical left, but lost control to a new generation
of extreme nationalists.
Pressure groups who worked with and in support of the
government on issues of naval power, colonies, and cultural
education, found it more and more difficult to continue
because of foreign policy failures, disagreement on issues
such as what types of ships to be built, the size of the
navy, and the strength of the army. In addition, there
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existed a growing antagonism between the burgeoning self-
conscious middle class and the interests of the landed
elite. It was only a matter of time before leaders of
nationalist pressure groups would break-out to form new
parties based on broad appeals to national interests, even
though many in the organizations believed politics to be a
dirty business and could not understand compromising on
issues of national security importance. 47
I' . POWER OF IDEAS
The rise of German nationalism, whether fueled by the
pressure groups, or simply channeled, must be viewed in the
context of the period. Germany was not alone in
experiencing this surge of national egotism. The United
States claimed its "Manifest Destiny," and in 1898 entered
the world scene as a major power with its defeat of Spain
and the addition of overseas colonies to its possessions. 48
France had turned its energies towards Africa after its
defeat in 1871. Great Britain continued its empire building
and demonstrated strong nationalistic tendencies when
dealing with the Muhjadin in the Sudan, the Chinese, and the
Boers. 49 When the Russian Baltic fleet inadvertently sank a
47Eley, Reshaping the German Right, p. 57.
48Kenneth Hagan, This People's Navy, (New York: The Free
Press, 1991), pp. 207-227.
49Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria's Little Wars, (New York: W.
W. Norton and Company, 1972), pp. 330-353.
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couple of British fishing boats, the nation's press and
public called for war and the destruction of the Russian
fleet. As it turned out, the Russian fleet met its end at
the hands of the Japanese in the Battle of Tsushima in
1905. 50 The dawn of the "Rising Sun" had arrived. Russian
Pan-Slavism called for the protection of all slavs in the
Balkans, at the expense of the Austro-Hungarian and the
Ottoman Empires. This explosion of virulent nationalism
gripped most major nation states between the 1870's and the
First World War.
Social Darwinism also played an important role in
shaping ideas of the time. According to it, only the strong
nations would survive and flourish, and lesser peoples would
disappear or be subjugated by the fittest. The power of
these ideas, national identity, self-determination, and
Social Darwinism can not be underestimated. Coupled with
unprecedented changes in social demographics and the
introduction of mass media, these ideas were used to
manipulate and mobilize millions of people. The
conservatives elites wanted to maintain their position of
power in an ever faster changing world. By alienating the
workers, these attitudes and actions appeared to aid the
extreme left. Consequently, the new radical right demanded
changes which set itself as odds with the conservative
right.
50Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 277.
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Memberships in the National Pressure Groups steadily
rose from 1890 to the outbreak of war in 1914. For example,
the Navy League began in 1898 with 14,252 members. By 1914,
it claimed 331,493. 51 If one counted all organizations
affiliated with the Navy League, over one million people
were involved. 52 The Navy League was the largest of such
pressure groups. These massive non-traditional
organizations of broad appeal exerted enormous political
pressure without being subject to the politics of the
Reichstag. 53
Intensive nationalistic rivalries between the states of
Europe, Social Darwinism, and the notion of national
destiny, were, in part, outlets for the mounting internal
social pressures caused by rapid industrialization and
urbanization. New technology allowed mass media, creating
political awareness never before known. The political scene
of Germany reflected the fracturing of society. None of the
old class divisions accurately reflected the emerging social
order.
New industrial elites began to exert political
influence. The middle class expanded to encompass the
growing numbers of white collar workers and administrators.
Fueled by modern ideas of Marxists and socialists, the





expanding working class began to unite for the common
purpose of overthrowing the old order. Young and restless,
Germany, wielded great military and industrial might. With
its internal divisions and social\political tensions it was
fast becoming a danger to itself and the European order.
G. THE COMING STO~
A grave, indeed fatal, political crisis loomed over
Germany in the final years before the First World War. An
already fractured and sectional political system grew
increasingly divided. The traditional conservative elites
found themselves under assault from both the left and the
right. The new radical right had taken the ideas used by
Bismarck before the 1890s to rally support against the left,
and pushed them to new extremes. The national pressure
groups sewed the seeds of mass political parties. Using
modern technology for printing and distributing information
and propaganda, including motion pictures, they created a
mass political awareness which broke past regional,
confessional and sectional differences.
The clash between old and new, status-quo and change,
threatened the autocratic powers of the Kaiser and Prussia's
dominance in the Reich's federation. The government's
juggling act of forming coalitions and using foreign policy
diversions to gain consensus could not continue. A
relatively peaceful transition of power between conservative
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ruling forces and parliamentarians may have occurred within
a few years of 1912, but the constitution's structure made
this difficult, and would have required that ruling elites
willingly give up their power. Wolgang Mommsen captured the
essence of the political crisis:
The causes of the First World War must be sought not in the
blunders and miscalculations of the governments alone, but in
the fact that Germany's governmental system, as well as
Austria-Hungary's and Russia's, was no longer adequate in the
face of rapid social change and the steady advance of mass
politics. 54
The government and army perceived an eminent civil war.
Events in the Balkans seemed to offer an opportunity to
check this trend, at least temporarily.
Gavrilo Princep's assassination of the heir to the
throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, in Sarejevo on 28 June 1914,55 has been called
the "spark" which set the "tinder box" afire. Tensions in
Europe had been on the rise for over a decade. The Anglo-
German naval arms race had pushed Great Britain towards
France and Russia. Germany's only strong ally, Austria-
Hungary, found itself constantly at odds with Russia in the
Balkans. France, recovered from the humiliating defeat of
1871, sought to regain the lost provinces of Alsace-
Lorraine.
54Ibid, p. 293.
55Craig, Germany, p. 334.
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Each country perceived that a quick military victory
world be possible and desirable. France believed that, with
the aid of powerful Russia in the east and Great Britain in
the west, it could regain its prestige and importance in
Europe. Russia, still reeling from the military defeat of
the 1905 Russo-Japanese War and the internal revolution that
followed, hoped to turn back progressive liberalism and
solidify its position in.the Balkans. 56 Great Britain felt
the strains of meeting a challenge to its global Empire. A
chance to defeat the German naval threat before it could
grow too powerful appealed to many British imperialists. 57
The Austro-Hungarian Empire, a diverse collection of ethnic
nationalities with growing internal tensions, viewed the war
as a chance to block the Russian and Pan-Slavic threat to
parts of its Empire.
In the conservative tradition of dealing with domestic
problems with foreign policy diversions, the prospects of a
victorious war to slow down or reverse "progressive"
tendencies appealed to Germany's Chancellor, Bethman-
Hollweg. In addition, Germany's past foreign policy
blunders had led to virtual encirclement, something the
great Bismarck had always worked hard to avoid. Germany's
only real ally, Austria-Hungary, looked weaker and weaker
56Bond, War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970, pp. 72-98.
57Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-
1914, pp. 441-463.
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every year. Confronted with yet another crisis in the
Balkans, Germany had the choice of either backing down from
supporting Austria-Hungary, or giving its full support.
Declining to support Austria-Hungary would likely have led
to Vienna's demise or defection to Germany's enemies.
The growing radical right would view either course as a
foreign policy disaster, and attack the government. By
supporting the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Balkan crisis,
it was hoped that a weakened Russia would back down, as it
had in 1909, and possibly break the entente or at least
enhance Germany's position in the Balkans, in Europe, and at
home. 58 Another dimension was the German General Staff's
perceptions of Russia's growing military power. With French
investments, loans and grants, Russia had embarked on a vast
modernization program. New railroads were constructed into
Poland and western Russian territory, increasing the
country's military mobilization capabilities. 59
The German military viewed these developments with
apprehension. Germany's plans to successfully fight a two-
front war by attacking France with overwhelming force first
and achieve quick victory, and then transferring forces to
the eastern front, would become obsolete in a few years. 60
58Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars, pp. 22-40.
59Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, pp. 379-
397.
6°Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-
1914, pp. 430-431.
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Consequently, there were those in the General Staff who
advocated war in 1914, before the correlation of forces
could turn against Germany.61 Bethman-Hollweg faced these
real and perceived dangers in the fateful summer of 1914.
In the end, he gave Germany's unconditional support to
Austria-Hungary. Perhaps a greater person would have acted
differently. Unfortunately for Germany and Europe, the
course was set for war. 62
Bethman-Hollweg's gamble initially appeared to fail and
succeed at the same time. Russia declared war on Austria-
Hungary, obliging Germany to declare war on Russia.
Conflict became unavoidable, and because the chancellor had
no control over the military, events quickly got out of his
hands. Domestically, the unifying force of the pending war
seemed to end the political crisis. Even the Social
Democrats supported the government in the war effort. Mass
enthusiasm for seemed to make the war worthwhile, as long as
it was quick and successful.
61Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars, pp. 22-40.
62Note: For more information on the causes of the First
World War, refer to: Gordon A. Craig, Germany, 1866-1945. (See
previous citation) Andreas Hillgruber, Germany and the Two
World Wars, translated by William C. Kirby, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1981.
George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's
Euro~ean Order, Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890. (See
preVlOUS citation)
Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-
German Antagonism, 1860-1914, Atlantic Highlands: The Ashfield
Press,1980.
Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the
Great Powers. (See previous citation)
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H. THE FIRST WORLD ~
The German Army's autonomy from civilian control nearly
wrecked Bismarck's plans in the 1866 war against Austria-
Hungary, and the 1870-1871 war ag~inst France. In both
occasions the military pushed for goals which ran contrary
to Bismarck's political objectives. In each case Bismarck
eventually prevailed, though not without difficulty.
Ironically, the country which had produced the great
military thinker Clausewitz, did not heed his dictum that
"war is simply the continuation of politics or policies by
other means." Once war began, the military implemented its
war plans, drawn up in form since Count Schlieffen designed
them in 1905. 63 Rigid and inflexible they did not take into
consideration political concerns or objectives. The war
became all or nothing, unlimited in scope, completely out of
the civilian politicians' control.
The industrial changes which affected society also
transformed war itself. Mass production, transportation and
communication allowed nearly complete mobilization of a
country's human and material resources. Command and control
allowed for fairly effective deployments of armies with
millions of troops. The consequences were enormous and
quite unforeseen by most. Instead of a quick war of
maneuver, World War I, "The Great War," proved to be a
struggle of exhaustion.
63Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, p. 283.
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The war lasted four long years, claiming millions of
lives, and ending three of Europe's greatest imperial
dynasties- Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. During the
war, the extreme right advocated ambitious war aims for the
country. With the loss of overseas colonies, Germany looked
to the east to build a continental Empire, free from the
economic pressure of Britain, America, and France. The
costs of the war in human life and resources fed
progressively more ambitious demands. The inclusion of
Belgium and areas in occupied France, Poland, the Baltic
states and much of the Ukraine were added to the list. The
virtual military dictatorship of Field Marshal Hindenburg
and Ludendorff supported these aims. 64
By 1918, Germany's military had obtained almost all of
the war aims, except that the western allies would not
agree. Russia, racked with revolution, bowed out of the
war, relinquishing vast areas of the Empire. Freed from the
war in the east, Germany transferred troops to the western
front. Ludendorff devised a plan to separate the French and
British Armies, and force the British from the continent
before the United States could make its presence felt on the
battlefield. Spectacular success followed the offensive of
March of 1918, with the German army making the greatest
gains in the west since the first months of the war. The
war appeared to be going in German's favor.
64Andreas Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars, p. 44.
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With news of these late successes of the war, it is
understandable how shocked the general public was when it
learned that the Kaiser had abdicated, a new government had
formed, and a peace treaty was being negotiated. The German
Army did not appear to be beaten on the battlefield, though
it had been at Ludendorff's request that the Government sued
for peace. The army's "stab in the back" myth was born. 65
With the end of the war, a new Republic was formed in
Germany. Unfortunately, the pre-war political crisis had
not been resolved. The war only acted to increase
differences and fracture the older parties. In addition the
to the turmoil caused by defeat in war, the new Weimar
Republic inherited the pre-war political confrontation. The
millions of young men, scarred by the horrors of modern war,
returning from the battlefields, would constitute another
divisive force on Germany's political landscape.
65Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, p. 22.
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III. DEMOCRACY FALLS TO NATIONAL SOCIALISM: 1918-1945
A. THE REPUBLIC IS FOUNDED
The allies' refusal to deal with the Kaiser's government
and the military dictatorship of Ludendorff and Hindenburg
in October 1918, helped strengthen domestic agitation for
political reforms. The conservative elites and many from
the political center hoped to save the monarchial
institution with the creation of a constitutional monarchy
such as Great Britain's. However, an uprising, starting in
the naval ports, quickly spread throughout Germany. The
Kaiser, forced to abdicate, fled to Holland. The Social
Democrats were willing to compromise with the middle class
parties on the idea of a constitutional monarchy, yet the
extreme left elements of the SPD agitated for a socialist
revolution similar to the Bolshevik upheaval in Russia. 66
Out of this political chaos emerged a new Social
Democratic government, determined to work with the old
middle class parties in the formation of a new constitution.
The SPD acted as a moderating force in its desire to return
66Note: for more information on the founding of the Weimar
Republic, please see;
Detlev J. K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic, translated by
Richard Deveson (New York: Hill and Wang, 1987).
Craig, Germany, 1866-1945.
Rosenberg, The Birth of the German Republic, 1871-1918.
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to "normalcy."67 The first postwar election to the
Reichstag was held in 1919. The results did not give any
one party a majority in the Reichstag. Once again, the
formation of coalitions became necessary to pass any
legislation. The Centre, Liberal, and Conservative Parties
banned together to form a coalition against the SPD and more
extreme left.
The loss of the war, the shock of the Kaiser's
abdication, and the domestic chaos temporarily weakened the
conservative and extreme right forces in Germany. Stripped
of colonies and limited to a small navy and army, Germany's
national pressure groups had few of their traditional
platforms from which to agitate on. Most members and groups
leaders turned to politics. The Weimar Republic under
Friedrich Ebert, a moderate Social Democrat, found itself
dependent on the institutions and structures of the
Empire. 68 Real and perceived dangers from the extreme left,
notably the Spartakist uprising in 1919-20, forced the new
government to rely on the Army.69 Consequently, the Army, a
bastion of conservatism, remained autonomous. The
Versailles Treaty inadvertently helped the Army maintain its
conservative core by limiting it to 100,000 men, thus
67John Hiden, ed., Germany and Europe, 1919-1939, 2nd ed.
(New York: Longman Publishing, 1993), pp.36-41.
68Peukert, The Weimar Republic, pp. 17,30,33,228.
69Holborn, A History of Modern Germany, pp. 526-531.
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encouraging the preservation of a small but very dedicated
and loyal officer corps.70
The bureaucracy, the education system, and the church
maintained their conservative orientation. The Republic
never managed to purge these institutions, perhaps because
of the internal instability and constant change of power
from one cabinet to the next never allowed for much
continuity in policy. The end result was that all of the
institutions which help strengthen and support a government
remained arch conservative, with most of them yearning for a
return of the monarchy.71
The founding of the Republic brought major electoral
reforms. The Prussian three-class voting system was
abolished,72as were the electoral district laws which had
favored the sparsely populated rural country. Instead,
parties received proportional representation in the
Reichstag based on the number of votes won. Unfortunately,
this helped foster even greater political splintering,
because any new party or particularist organization could
likely win a few seats. The system still favored the
established parties, yet it did not attempt to build any
bonds between voters and parliament representatives.
Members of the Reichstag still received their seats from the
7°Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, p. 367.
71Craig, Germany, 1866-1945, pp. 417-425.
72Ibid.
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party rather than the voters. Consequently, there still
existed a lack of personal responsibility to constituents.
The masses only participated in the political process by
voting for a certain party. Once'the election was over,
there were few venues for continued active political
involvement, except when national referendums were held.
The power structures underwent some major changes. The
Reichstag became the primary seat of power with the ability
to initiate new legislation. The Chancellor and his cabinet
became responsible to the parliament. Constitutional
changes had to pass the Reichstag with a two-thirds vote,
nearly impossible in the diverse and fractured political
scene. The Bundesrat, now Reichsrat, became a mere
mouthpiece for state interests. 73 Seats were filled by the
states' governing party_ The states managed to keep a great
deal of autonomy until 1930. The most powerful position in
Germany was the office of the President.
Perhaps with nostalgia for the past, the President's
powers were not unlike those of the Kaiser. .The President
appointed the Chancellor, commanded the army, and had
special emergency powers under Article 48 of the
Constitution. Intended to be a safeguard for protecting the
fragile democracy, Article 48 allowed the Chancellor to rule
by emergency decree through the approval of the President.
In view of the domestic unrest of 1918-1919, the attempted
73Ibid, p. 419.
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communist revolution, and the revolution in Russia, one can
understand why the authors of the constitution gave
extraordinary power to the President. After all, the
President was elected by the people, and sworn to support
the constitution. Ironically, without the powers of Article
48, the Republic could not likely survive the political
chaos, y~t it was Article 48 which allowed the Republic to
be destroyed. 74
B. POLITICAL PARTIES
The political parties of postwar Germany reflected the
continued radicalization of politics, exacerbated by the
loss of the war and the ensuing economic and political
chaos. New parties emerged on both extremes. They were
more militant, and they were determined to force change in
their favor. Unwilling to compromise, these fringe parties
only added to the confusion, and disrupted the already
difficult task of returning stability to Germany. Once it
became obvious that the moderate center parties could not
handle the growing problems, the polarization of the
political scene between extreme left and right became
greater, drawing off support from the center.
On the left, the Social Democrats were no longer the
extreme party. Division over the SPD's role in supporting
the war and on the post war reforms, led to secession of the
74Berghahn, Modern Germany, p. 93.
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Independent Socialists Party (USPD) .75 Further on the left
were the communists who aspiring for a "dictatorship of the
proletariat." The Communist Party of Germany (KPD) would
grow from a mere four seats in the 1920 Reichstag to
seventy-seven in 1930 out of a total of 452. 76 The
political left continued to predominantly represent the
working class. 77
In response to perceived and perhaps real dangers of the
left, the radicalization of the right became even greater.
Hitler's National Socialist German Worker's Party (NSDAP),
founded in 1920, came to represent the extreme right,
absorbing other radical nationalist parties and
organizations by 1932. 78 In 1920, the NSDAP was an obscure
Bavarian fringe group. After the failed Hitler/Ludendorff
Beer Hall Putsch in Bavaria in 1923, Hitler set about to
build the Party into a mass organization. The results were
impressive. In 1928 the NSDAP only gained twelve seats in
the Reichstag, but by 1930, the Nazis claimed an astounding
107 seats. 79 The 1932 elections further increased the
75Craig, Germany, p. 433.
76Ibid.
77Ib1.'d, 452p. .
78The German National People's Party (DNVP) disbanded in
1933, many members joining the NSDAP, Berghahn, Modern Germany,
pp. 126-127. for more information on the DNVP see; Lewis
Hertzman, DNVP, Right-Wing O~position in the Weimar Republic,
1918-1924, (Lincoln: Univers1.ty of Nebraska Press, 1963).
79Berghahn, Modern Germany, p. 112.
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strength of the NSDAP with a jump to 230 seats in the
Reichstag, almost one half of the total. 80
Support for the Nazi party came primarily from the
middle class. 81 Though the party claimed to .be a "Workers
Party," support from the working class remained minor.
Those who avidly joined the national pressure groups in pre-
war years, now flocked to the banner of the Nazis. In that
sense, the NSDAP reflected the trend established in the
1890's: a class conscious, status oriented middle class felt
threatened by the prospects of a workers revolution. The
growing industrialization of the German economy, economic
disaster and hyper-inflation in 1923, and the collapse of
the world economy beginning in 1929, compounded the
situation.
The small farmers, shopkeepers, craftsmen, and artisans
of Germany saw their survival being threatened by the forces
of change, and not surprisingly fell victim to the
propaganda and promises of Hitler's party. As John Breuilly
states:
It was not specifically Nazi components of his (Hitler's)
(anti-semitism, race-centered nationalism. the drive for
living space in the east) which appealed so much as the belief
that he and his party had a better chance than most (and at
least deserved and opportunity) of creating a strong
8°Craig, Germany, p. 562.
81Hans Speier, German White Collar Workers and the Rise of
Hitler, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. xiii,3,69-
79.
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government which would tackle the problems besetting Germany. 82
When it became obvious to the more moderate conservative
right that Hitler's party was the dominant political force
besides the SPD and the KPD, they attempted to co-opt
Hitler, only to be co-opted themselves. The industrial
elites waited until the end, but preferred Hitler's right-
wing politics to the social reforms of the left.
The traditional political parties became weaker after
each major crisis which confronted the state. Initially, in
1919, the political scene superficially looked very similar
to the one before the war, with the exception of name
changes and minor splintering. By 1930 however, the
moderate parties were all very weakened, especially the
progressive and liberal parties of the German Democratic
Party (DDP) and the German Peoples Party (DVP) , formerly the
National Liberals. The conservative German National
People's Party (DNVP) and the Conservative People's Party
suffered also, as did the Centre and Bavarian People's Party
(BVP) .
The combined percentage of voters for all of these
parties in 1930 was only 40.8%, far from a majority. The
Social Democrats remained the largest party with 24.6% of
the votes. The Nazi Party was not far behind with 18.3%.
The communists held 13.1% of the vote. Two years later the
situation became impossible for the voices of moderation.
82John Breuilly, ed., The State of Germany, p. 16.
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At that time the combined vote for the above mentioned
coalition parties plummeted to 25.7%, while those cast for
the NSDAP doubled to 37.3%.83
C. FORCES OF RADICALIZATION
Numerous factors contributed to the political
radicalization of Germany during the twenties and early
thirties. Only three major ones are explored here. First,
it has already been mentioned that the social changes
resulting from industrialization left vast segments of the
population disorientated or disenchanted with their
worsening political and social situation. Second, the
experience of the First World War and the imposition of the
humiliating Versailles Treaty, combined to give the forces
of the right political ammunition in their campaign to find
scapegoats for Germany's ills. The economic crises of 1923
and 1929 contributed greatly to the radicalization of German
politics. The hyper-inflation of 1923 wiped out small
businessmen, artisans, craftsmen, small farmers, and family
savings. Gordon Craig has described this process as
follows:
The failure of the first German experiment with republican
government was foreordained when the one commodity that more
than any other seemed to give people a means of rational
assessment of their situation lost its power to do so any
longer. For millions of Germans, that unprecedented and
bewildering event (inflation of '23) hopelessly compromised
faith in representative government and encouraged the growth
83Berghahn, Modern Germany, p. 113.
47
of messianism and utopianism. The beneficiary of that
transformation of values was Adolf Hitler. 84
The Republic managed to overcome the crisis of 1923, yet the
political radicalization of the left and right was already
nearly complete. When the world's economy failed in 1929,
these extreme forces were ready to take advantage of the
situation.
Far from healing the wounds caused by the First World
War, the Versailles Treaty opened new ones and condemned
Europe and the world to the prospects of future conflict.
When the German government first requested an armistice, it
believed that the negotiations would be governed by American
President Wilson's magnanimous "Fourteen Points." Instead,
the allies forced a unconditional Diktat upon the Germans.
The French were eager to strip Germany of any capacity
to threaten France again. Germany lost Alsace-Lorraine back
to France, parts of its eastern territory to Poland, and
minor territorial sections to Denmark and Belgium.
Germany's armed forces were seriously limited, making
Germany one of the weakest military powers in Europe. The
once proud High Sea fleet was scuttled. Germany could not
build submarines or warships greater then 10,000 tons.
Limited to 100,000 men, the German Army was forbidden from
building tanks. Nor could the Germans form an air force.
All of Germany's overseas colonies were taken, as was the
84Craig, The Germans, p. 121.
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bulk of its merchant fleet. 8s As if these measures were not
serious enough, the allies forced Germany to accept sole
blame for the war and to agree to full compensation for
damages and allied expenses in the war. Of course, had the
Germans won the war, their terms would have been as harsh or
harsher. The German Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Russia in
1917-18, stripped vast territory from the former Empire.
To the average German however, the Versailles Treaty was
absurd and humiliating. Believing the propaganda of the
war, the Germans saw themselves as the victims of Russian
and French aggression. The army maintained it was not
defeated on the battlefield, but by the loss of support on
the home front. Thus the famous "stab in the back," by the
"November criminals," became the political slogan of the far
right and nationalist conservatives. 86
Part of the Versailles Treaty called for reparation
payments to the victors. In August 1919 the allies forced
Germany to begin paying twenty billion gold marks, due by
May 1921, when a reparations committee would report its
recommendations for the total bill. 87 Germapy had only 2.4
billion gold marks in its reserves. The Reparations
Commission finally recommended that Germany pay a total of
8SHiden, Germany and Europe, 1919-1939, pp. 20-31.
86Bracher, The German Dictatorship, pp. 34,66,97.
87Craig, Germany, p. 437.
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132 billion gold marks. ss Germany eventually managed to
avoid this, but not without destroying its financial
solvency and tolerating the French and Belgian occupation of
the Saar industrial region. s9
Germany's financial management of the war had been ill-
conceived. Direct taxes on the wealthy and business profits
were avoided in favor of reliance on war bonds and loans.
With the loss of overseas trading, the merchant fleet, the
imposition of enormous reparations payments, and, when the
government defaulted, allied occupation of Germany's
industrial heartland, Germany experienced hyper-inflation of
unimaginable proportions. In July 1914, 4.2 marks equalled
one United States dollar. Five years later the ratio was
almost nine marks to the dollar. By November 1923 the
figures were meaningless, 4.2 trillion marks to the
dollar. 90
Though the government eventually solved this crisis,
millions of Germans remained financially bankrupt and
psychologically scarred, resenting those who managed to make
fortunes through speculating, and the politicians who
seemingly allowed it to happen. When the American stock
market crashed in October 1929, the impact was felt





in 1928, nearly 1.4 million, to 8.5 percent, 1.9 million, in
1929. The trend continued to worsen through 1930 and 1931
until it reached a staggering thirty percent unemployed, 5.6
million, in 1932. 91 It is likely that the memories of 1923
were still fresh in the minds of many. The massive
unemployment of workers and middle class led to an increase
in political violence from the left and the right. Hitler's
party had been preparing for an opportunity such as this
since 1923. The economic crisis which began in 1929 gave
political ammunition to the Nazi Party, allowing it to play
on millions of people's fears, anxieties, anger, and
paranoia, reinforced by the memories of 1923. The political
crisis which began in the 1890s was on the brink of civil
war. Out of this chaos, Hitler would emerge as self-
proclaimed savior.
D. THE NAZI RISE TO POWER
Given,Germany's historical and political developments,
coupled with the social and economic changes of the period,
it is certainly not surprising that some form of right-wing
extremism would emerge. As the above suggests, the process
began back in the 1890s with distant roots going further
back in time. The NSDAP represented only one variation of
this political radicalization. The key difference was
Hitler. Hitler's beliefs, goals, aspirations, and hates
91Berghahn, Modern Germany, p. 284.
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became intertwined with the party. Hitler declared that he
was neither left nor right, but the most extreme embodiment
of both. National Socialism embraced the radical concepts
of Marxist\Leninism and the Pan-Germans. It is debatable
whether the NSDAP would have ever left its humble beginnings
in Munich without Hitler. With Hitler, an unimportant
fringe movement became a mass party, used to gain complete
control over the German nation.
Yet, Hitler did not invent National Socialism. Karl
Dietrich Bracher had stated:
The German Workers' Party (Deutsche Arbeiter Partei, or DAP) ,
which Hitler encountered in Munich in 1919, was certainly
nothing new. Though its formation and growth were closely
connected with the recent military defeat, and the
revolutionary climate of 1918-19, it could not have come into
being except for the intellectual, social, and political
growth of Austro-German voelkisch nationalism. It was one of
the numerous sectarian "anti" movements- anti-Semitic, anti-
Western, anti-Slav- that accompanied Germany on the road to
the twentieth century. 92
The theoretical framework of National Socialism was written
by Rudof Jung, a railroad engineer who joined the DAP in
1910. National Socialism, Its development and Its Goals,
Jung hoped would be as important for National Socialism as
Marx's Das Kapital was for socialism. According to
Bracher:
Its point of departure was a lament over the destruction of
German culture by foreign influences: modern civilization
and "mammonism," wage labor and finance capital, liberal
democracy and Marxism. Behind this process, Jung saw the
forces of international Jewry seeking world domination,
92Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship, translated
by Jean Steinberg (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 50.
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forces which dominated capitalism and liberal democracy as
well as Marxian socialism. 93
The ground work was laid for National Socialism well before
Hitler became interested in politics. When Hitler did seize
on National Socialism, however, he molded it to fit his
needs and aspirations.
Hitler, born in April 20, 1889 to lower middle class
Austrian parents, was an unlikely candidate for supreme
leader of all the Germans. 94 An aspiring artist, Hitler
never made it into art school, which lead to dejection and
frustration. In 1913, Hitler moved to Munich. It was in
Munich where Hitler experienced the mass elation in August
1914 at the call to arms to defend the Reich against the
Russian and French aggressors.
The war experiences transformed Hitler. The near
constant danger of front line combat formed strong bonds of
camaraderie between men, regardless of social standing. The
war brought out the best and worst in people. Serving with
distinction, Hitler received the Iron Cross (2nd class) for
bravery, rare for a corporal. Recovering in a hospital
after a gas attack, Hitler learned of Germany's surrender. 95





blackest days of his life, and attributed it to his decision
to enter politics and right the injustice done to Germany.
The roots of Hitler's anti~semitism have been attributed
to his youthful days in Vienna, the cosmopolitan capital of
the Hapsburg Empire. Virulent anti-semitism existed
throughout Europe. Persecution of the Jews was ancient.
Hitler did not have to look hard in the Vienna of the fin-
de-siecle, to find all sorts of radical and bizarre ideas
about Jews. 96 The tragedy was that Hitler took his anti-
semitism to its extreme, making it state policy. The fact
that Hitler ordered and approved the "Final Solution,"
demonstrates that Hitler was not simply using it as a
political weapon. Racism and anti-semitism represented an
integral part of Hitler'~ political agenda after he gained
power.
In a cold, brutal logic, Hitler devised a solution to
maintaining German racial purity. Many nationalists argued
that annexations would only weaken the German blood and
spirit. Hitler's plans called for building a continental
empire, free from the economic pressures of Great Britain
and the growing United States, and the extermination or
deportation of people on the land to be claimed for Germans.
The 1918 war aims of the Pan-Germans and Fatherland Party
found their way into Hitler's foreign policy. Bent on
96Ibid, p. 57.
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achieving his continental empire, Hitler would plunge the
world into the Second World War.
In order to restructure the European continent in his
fashion, Hitler had to first obtain power in Germany.
Initially, Hitler envisioned gaining the support of the
working class. Uniting the strong German workers into a
nationally invigorated community was Hitler's dream. He
believed the middle class to be weak, cowardly, and
materialistic. For him, the elite fell into two categories.
Those who obtained their position in society through bi,rth,
Hitler held in contempt, whereas those who worked their way
up to the top through hard work, determination and
intelligence, Hitler respected. The latter fit into his
ideas of survival of the fittest.
Hitler's Nazi ideology cannot be seen as simply radical
right-wing. Hitler took ideas from all parts of the
political spectrum. National Socialism consisted of
building a new classless society in which success was open
to anyone who could perform. A unique blend of capitalism
with government planning would ensure that all were treated
fairly, and that the best and the brightest could excel.
Religion was to be supplanted by Nazi ideology, which would
not tolerate degenerate art, literature, or behavior.
Society was to be reborn on the pure and noble German
cultural past, instead of the twisted liberal ideas of the
West. The nation and the community would come first. In
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this new society, the small farmers were to be respected and
elevated in status for their historical bonds to the sacred
German soil.
Ironically, Hitler realized that he needed to appeal to
the status conscious and "morally weak" middle class in
order to obtain his dreams. The support he had hoped for
from the working class never materialized. After the 1928
elections, Hitler purposefully began to tone down his anti-
semitism and expansionistic rhetoric. Instead, he tried to
appeal to people's frustrations and fears over the economic
crisis which began in 1929. Promising to rebuild Germany,
put people back to work, and restore Germany's pride and
prestige, Hitler touched the right chords.
The 1930 elections made the Nazi Party the second
largest in the Reichstag. Two years later, it was the
largest party in Germany. This was a major achievement,
considering the sectionalism of German politics. Even so,
sixty percent of the German voters did not support Hitler at
the height of his political success. Of the social classes,
25 percent of all blue collar workers voted for the NSDAP,
as did 29 percent of the white collar workers. Self-
employed voters gave the greatest support, with 42 percent
voting for the Nazis. This supports the observation that
the industrial age placed great social and economic strains
on the once prosperous and respected craftsmen and artisans.
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The crises of 1923 and 1929 only worsened their plight,
ruining many small businessmen and self-employed.
Hitler viewed the world and life in a rigid and
unalterable way. A political genius who could work masses
of people into hysteria with his oratorical skills, Hitler
also possessed an uncanny ability to sense people's fears,
anxieties, and hopes. Charismatic and intelligent, Hitler
surrounded himself with loyal and dedicated people.
Talented organizers and technicians helped Hitler create a
mass party utilizing state of the art media to reach out and
influence people. Massive party rallies awed those who
attended with pageantry, discipline and special visual
effects. Circumstances gave Hitler the opportunity to rise
to power, but it was Hitler's ruthless political genius and
timing which made it achievable.
E. END OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC
The story of Hitler's rise to power does not end with
his electoral success in 1932. Though the Nazi party
controlled the most seats, it did not have a clear mandate
to run the country. Two-thirds of the Reichstag was
required to make any constitutional changes. A combination
of several factors allowed Hitler to gain power. Already,
the conservative and moderate parties were ruling without a
Reichstag majority through the emergency powers of the
President. Hoping to tie Hitler to their needs and gain his
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large base of support to combat the left, the conservatives
underestimated Hitler's intelligence. Hitler realized this
and capitalized on it. Hitler stated in 1932:
'The power is there, , they are saying. 'How would it be if we
harnessed ourselves behind it.' They are gradually realizing
that we National Socialists are a movement to be reckoned
with, that I am a born tub-thumper, whom they can make good
use of. Why should this brilliant movement, they think, with
its drummer-boy, not also have brilliant field-marshalls.
This drummer-boy is the only one who can drum up support; they
themselves are the only ones capable of government. They all
have 'von' in front of their names, the best proof of their
capabilities. 97
Believing they could control Hitler with the backing of the
aging President Hindenburg, the elites gave Hitler his price
for entering into a coalition government, the
Chancellorship. Within fifteen months, Hitler consolidated
his position. The death of Hindenburg in 1934, gave Hitler
the chance to combine the offices of President and
Chancellor into one, thus becoming the Fuehrer (leader) of
the German people.
The Weimar Republic was not destined to fall. To say
that democracy failed because there were not enough
democrats is too simplistic. For fourteen years the
Republic struggled to overcome enormous problems, which
other Western nations faced with great difficulty.
Germany's political transformation must be seen in the
context of the period. The United States and Great Britain,
~Ronald Smelser, and Rainer Zitelmann, ed., The Nazi Elite,
translated by Mary Fischer (Washington Square: New York
University Press, 1989, 1993(trans)), p. 120.
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two long established democracies which had legitimacy and
trust of the people, were also forced to intervene into
people's lives on an unprecedented scale. The three-way
struggle between the workers, the conservative elites, and
the middle class, accentuated by industrialization,
demographic change and the power of ideas made available
through mass media, all worked to make Germany's political
situation extremely volatile.
The First World War had only temporarily eased these
tensions. Before the war was over, the struggle began
again, soon to be aggravated by the additional burdens of a
lost war, the Versailles Treaty, enormous reparations, the
loss of territory, and humiliation. The new German Republic
faced these challenges against the background of sectional,
confessional, and class differences. The structural
weakness of the political system, plus the entrenchment of
the old order in the bureaucracy, army, judicial system,
education, and church, all worked to undermine the
legitimacy of the Republic and its ability to overcome
periods of acute crises, such as the hyper-inflation of
1923, and the Great Depression beginning in 1929. In the
end it was the conservatives who handed Hitler the reigns of
power, believing they could control him and regain their
lost power.
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F. THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WAR
Although Hitler's "New Order" called for a classless
society based on racial German values in a "national
community," the old elites managed to cling to some of their
power and status in the Third Reich. Industrial elites
benefited during the early years of Hitler's rule. With
unions abolished, labor agitation was redirected into Nazi
controlled organizations which worked with industry.
Rearmament and early conquests stimulated production and
gave access to raw materials, yielding great profits.
The old conservative officer corps retained much of its
control over the army, and gave its support to Hitler at the
price of the elimination of the Storm Troopers' (SA)
leadership, especially, Ernst Roehm in 1934. Hitler later
tied the army to himself with a pledge of loyalty, sworn on
their honor. Many levels of the state bureaucracy, from
administrators to educators, remained in their positions
after the Nazi seizure of power. Only those who did not
give allegiance to Hitler, conform to Nazi policies, or who
were "racially unfit", were forced to leave. Therefore,
many of the old conservative elites and their supporters
remained in positions of power and influence.
After the "July Plot" of 1944 ta assassinate Hitler,
failed, he lamented, "We have liquidated the left wing class
warriors, but unfortunately in so doing we forgot to strike
out to the right as well. That is our greatest sin of
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omission. 1198 Consequently, instead of a true totalitarian
regime with a monolithic party at the controls, Germany
resembled a feudal kingdom with various lords struggling to
keep or expand their power at each other's expense. Yet,
allowed allegiance and power to Hitler.
Inefficiency, overlapping jurisdiction and internal
rivalries make Germany's war effort seem amazing. Hitler
promoted this form of governing, for it pitted extremely
ambitious people against each other and kept them separated,
all looking to Hitler for favor and arbitration. Otherwise,
Hitler feared they would connive against him and his
position. This led to a contradiction in Nazi social policy
and reality. Hitler's social and cultural revolution was
never completed. The demands of the war forced Hitler to
rely on old institutions and power elites. The result of
this complex system of governing was the eventual backlash
of public opinion. The Nazi Party and ruling Nazi elites
were increasingly viewed with contempt and disgust.
Duplicity and petty bickering between those in power made a
mockery of the system. Subsequently, support for Nazism
began to wane by 1943, especially after the news of defeat
at Stalingrad. 99
98Ibid, p. 127.
99Ian Kershaw, The Hi tIer Myth, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1987), pp. 188-195.
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Nevertheless, Hitler's popularity managed to survive
until the final months of the war. The average German
believed that Hitler was not to blame for many of the war's
misfortunes; the petty party officials and bureaucrats were
the problem. The German defeat at Stalingrad in the winter
of 1942-43, forced many people to realize that perhaps the
war could not be won. lOO Still, people could not imagine
that Germany would be conquered. Faith in Hitler remained
high. His past successes conditioned the German people to
believe that he was a genius and would somehow save Germany.
The final years of the war hardened people's attitudes
towards the Nazi Party. The state frantically employed
propaganda, intimidation and coercion to maintain the war
effort. Many front-line soldiers fought on out of fear that
the state would punish their families if they deserted or
surrendered. The Allied bombing effort and the collapsing
borders made state control over the masses difficult in the
final year of the war. The last ditch efforts of the Party
and state to defend the Reich through exhortations and
propaganda of wonder weapons only left people more skeptical
and disenchanted. There were still those who fought
fanatically either for Hitler or for the defense of their
homeland, but the majority simply wanted an end to the war.
lOODetlev J. K. Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1987), p. 63.
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Hitler's rise to power and the ensuing horrors of the
Second World War, which no German could escape, marked a
climax in the three way struggle between the growing number
of blue collar workers, the middle class, and the old
conservative elites. The majority of the middle class
supported Hitler's party, yet it was the conservatives who
handed Hitler the reigns of power. In this act they became
accomplices to the Nazi crimes against humanity, destroying
their cohesion as a group and consequently their power.
The devastation of the war in Europe is unimaginable
today. By 1945, all major German cities were mere shadows
of their former selves. The civilian casualties in Germany
were estimated in the millions. No city greater than 50,000
people escaped bombing .101 Berlin's population dropped
thirty percent, with seventy-five percent of the buildings
damaged or destroyed. 102 The conquering Soviet Army sought
to avenge itself on the German citizens for the brutality
and devastation Germans had wrought on Russians. Unlike the
First World War, the German Army and people could not deny
that they had been defeated. The physical occupation by
British, American, and Soviet forces made the defeat utterly
complete. The rounding up of Nazi elites and officials for
war trials brought to light the truth of Germany's genocidal
101Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West
Germany: From Shadow to Substance, 1945-1963, Vo. I, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), p. 30.
102Ibid.
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actions during the war. The horrors of the concentration
camps, the systematic murder of millions, and the true
nature of Hitler's war of aggression came out for all to
see.
Millions of Germans were forced from their homes in
territory ceded to Poland and Russia. Lack of shelter,
food, and other basic necessities, led to wide spread
disease and death. Germany's economy was completely
destroyed by the war. The black market became the only way
to sustain oneself. Gordon Craig aptly summarizes Germany's
situation.
Adolf Hitler was nothing if not thorough ... Because his work
of demolition was so complete, he left the German people
nothing that could be repaired or built upon. They had to
begin allover again, a hard task perhaps, but a challenging
one, in the facing of which they were not entirely bereft of
guidance. For HitIer had not only restored to them the
options that they had had a century earlier but had also
bequeathed to them the memory of horror to help them with
their choice. 103
Out of this chaos two different Germany's would emerge.
Both broke with the past, determined to overcome the
terrible consequences of the Third Reich.
The Allies' policy of breaking up the huge German
industrial cartels eliminated the enormous political power
of these elites. The loss of Germany's eastern territories
destroyed the old conservative power base. Defeated and
dishonored, the German Army no longer existed as a power in
the state. Abolished by the victorious powers, it reemerged
l03Craig, Germany, p. 764.
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in a new form, restructured and redesigned to uphold
democracy in West Germany and Western Europe. The judicial
and education system would take longer to transform, but the
major obstacles to political reform in the past had been
removed by the events of the Nazi rule, the war, and defeat.
The task of rebuilding the country, coupled with mass
migrations of people, helped break down particularist
differences.
Nationalism and racism in any form were discredited by
the Holocaust and Hitler's war. Life under the Nazi regime
also helped in building common bonds. The division of
Germany removed differences from the political scene. The
old political parties of the past learned valuable lessons
from the Weimar and Nazi experiences. In the western half
of Germany, the second attempt at democracy was thus made on
very different foundations than that of the Weimar Republic.
Unfortunately for the east Germans, they had no choice in
their form of government.
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V. GERMANY DIVIDED: 1945-1990
Until 1949, Germany remained occupied and without
sovereignty or a national government. Reconstruction had
begun, yet the scars of the war, both physical and mental,
still pre-dominated. The "Grand Alliance" between the
Western powers and the Soviet Union broke apart shortly
after Germany's defeat. A new rivalry for influence and
dominance in Europe began, pitting the two halves of Germany
against each other. A divided Germany became the center of
this new Super Power antagonism. Both Germanies became
model allies for their respective blocs. Any future war in
Europe would lead to German fighting German and result in
the destruction of both halves of Germany. Fortunately, a
shooting war never came and Germany was spared from becoming
the battleground for Europe.
German politics in East and West Germany after 1945
developed in the shadows of the ideological struggle between
the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and
the moral burden of the Second World War on the other. The
fact that Germany remained divided for the duration of the
Cold War demonstrates how powerful these forces were.
Germany lost control of its destiny after World War II.
Within a few years of the war's end, two independent states
developed in Germany, and for 45 years the fate of both was
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decided by the victors of Second World War. It took the end
of the Cold War and the agreement between the Soviet Union,
the United States, Great Britain and France to reunite
Germany.
The historical path which led to Hitler's Third Reich
and Germany's defeat and occupation has been charted. In
order to understand the problems confronting the reunited
Germany today, it is necessary to explore the political
economic, and social developments after the Second World
War. Though the West German Republic came to symbolize
stability, there were times when people asked, "is Bonn
Weimar?" Questions of democratic stability and viability in
Germany today can only be answered by gaining an
appreciation of how Germany has dealt with these problems in
the past. The focus here will be on West Germany, since its
political institutions emerged triumphant in reunification.
However, understanding the challenges of assimilating
sixteen million former communists into a democracy requires
a look at East German developments also.
A. A NEW REPUBLIC IN THE WEST
Founded in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany
combined the three Zones of Western Allied Occupation into a
single state. Viewed as a temporary measure until all of
Germany could be reunited, West Germany's Basic Law
(Constitution) reflected the commitment to rebuilding the
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German nation state. Article 146 specifically addresses the
reunification of Germany.104 At the time, few could imagine
that Germany would remain divided for 45 years. In
contrast, those 45 years conditioned most in the east and
west to accepting the division of Germany; though many
remained hopeful that reunification would eventually happen,
few imagined its occurrence in their lifetime.
The Basic Law of 1949 wa a "temporary" constitution,
yet, over time, it has come to symbolize stability,
strength, and freedom. With a turbulent and bloody past, it
is no wonder that most Germans view the Basic Law as sacred
and the strongest pillar of democracy; few think of changing
it, even after unification. The reason for such devotion is
the fact that the Basic Law has given Germans in the West
political stability unparalleled since the founding of the
German Empire in 1871.
Having the benefit of recent history, the drafters of
the Basic Law sought to overcome the weakness of the Weimar
Constitution. Unlike the Weimar Constitution, the Basic Law
has mechanisms which protect it from anti-democratic forces.
A party found to be committed to the destruction of
democracy can be banned. Since political parties must gain
at least five percent of the vote in order to be represented
in government, much of the splintering and chaos of the
l04Gert-Joachim Glaessner, The Unification Process in
Germany, translated by Colin B. Grant (London: Printer Publishers
Limited, 1992), p. 2.
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Weimar political scene has been avoided. Maintaining some
of the traditions of German parliamentary politics, some
structures of the past were kept. Changes were made,
however. Instead of parties simply filling all of their
allotted seats in parliament according to rank in party and
number of seats gained as a proportion of votes, one-half of
the seats would now be filled by candidates who won directly
in an election. With voters identifying with an individual
to represent them, instead of simply a party, a sense of
responsibility to the electorate develops.
Though the office of the President remained, its power
was seriously limited. His control over the armed forces
and emergency powers were stripped, leaving the him a
figure-head of state. The Reichstag became the Bundestag
with the majority party or coalition of parties forming the
government centered around the Chancellor's office. After
elections the President and party leaders choose a candidate
for Chancellor. If one-half of the Bundestag approves this
decision, then the President appoints the candidate
Chancellor. If the candidate fails to receive 50 percent of
the vote within fourteen days, a second candidate must be
named by the Bundestag. los To ensure that obstructionist
politics do no undermine the government, a "vote of no-
lOSBark and Gress, A History of West Germany, Vo. I, p. 250.
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confidence" must be immediately followed by a vote on a
successor. 106
The Bundesrat (upper House) remained intact.
Representing the interests of the Laender (states), its
seats are filled by appointed delegates from each state.
The number of seats each state gets depends on size and
population. Constitutional amendments and any legislation
which affects the states must be approved by the Bundesrat.
The Bundesrat may oppose other legislation, however, the
Bundestag can override it with a majority vote. If the
Bundesrat is controlled by the opposite party legislation
can be difficult, but the Bundestag can overcome this with
enough votes. Any serious political deadlock would result
,
in the President dissolving parliament and calling for new
elections.
Founded on solid structures, West German democracy still
had to overcome many other obstacles. Rebuilding the
economy and cities, sheltering millions of refugees from all
over Europe, Nazi war crimes, de-nazification, the physical
division of Germany, and military occupation, were all major
problems to contend with. At the same time, the division of
Germany and the occupation may have helped in the
establishment of a stable democracy. The occupying Allies
outlawed any successor parties to the NSDAP. The war
discredited extreme nationalism and racism, and the
l06Ibid.
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establishment of a communist government in eastern Germany
discredited communism for most West Germans, especially the
brutal repression of the June 1953 revolt. Consequently,
the extreme political elements were not as important in the
beginning when democracy was most vulnerable.
B. POLITICAL PARTIES
The first free elections since 1932 in West Germany were
held in 1949. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) under
Konrad Adenauerbarely won a majority.lo7 Under Adenauer's
strong leadership West Germany quickly. overcame the physical
destruction of the war. His personal experiences of the
Weimar years as Mayor of Cologne, and his differences with
the Nazi regime made him an excellent choice for bringing
Germany back into the community of nations. He witnessed
the nature of Weimar's fractured political scene, and he did
not sellout to the Nazis. West Germany owed him a great
debt for his hard work and perseverance.
The CDU eventually became the successor to the Centre
Party. Strong Catholic ties still existed, however, the CDU
became a mass party, drawing support from all Christian
denominations, and all parts of Germany .. Predominantly
middle class in orientation, the CDU also enjoyed support
from big business, public servants and farmers. Adenauer's
l07Lewis J. Edinger, Politics in Germany, (Boston: Little
Brown and Company, 1968), pp. 236-290.
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success in gaining recognition from the West, alliances with
the United States and NATO, and the economic recovery
engineered by his economic minister, Ludwig Erhard, all made
him extremely popular. The CDU capitalized on this until
the party lost its majority to the resurgent Social
Democratic Party (SPD) in 1969.
At age 87, Adenauer succumbed to party pressure to step
down in 1963. 108 Adenauer's success had been the party's
success. Once Adenauer was gone, the party found itself
lacking strong leadership. Nonetheless, the CDU\CSU
(Christian Social Union of Bavaria) managed to maintain a
consistent lead over the SPD in all elections except 1972.
The decisive factor was the Free Democratic Party (FDP),
which turned away from the CDU and sided with the SPD. From
1969 until 1983, the SPD\FDP coalition led West Germany.
Then the FDP returned to the CDU\CSU in a coalition which
has lasted to the present.
The 15 years of CDU\CSU rule were crucial for West
Germany as it gave the country time to heal the scars of the
war. The economic recovery helped build political
stability. From the 17 parties which ran in the first
Bundestag elections of 1949, 14 gained seats. By 1961, only
four major parties were represented in the Bundestag, the
108Bark and Gress, A History of West Germany, Vo. II, pp.
520-521.
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CDU, the CSU, the FDP, and the SPD. 109 Though other parties
have emerged since, some actually winning a few seats in the
Bundestag, few have demonstrated any staying power. The
Greens, an environmentalist party, and four extreme right-
wing parties are detailed later.
The smooth transition of power between the two major
parties, the CDU and the SPD, 1969, and 1983, proved the
viability of West German democracy. The ~erman voters had a
choice between two strong and capable parties with differing
yet moderate views. The competition between these two
parties was healthy and necessary for democracy to adapt to
changes in society.
The oldest political party in Germany, the SPD,
underwent a major transformation during the early years of
the West German Republic. A party of opposition, it drew
most support from the working class. With an agenda for a
"planned economy," and greater socialization, the middle
class and business interests remained opposed to the SPD.
The huge successes of the CDU in the early years forced the
SPD leadership to rethink their political strategy. The
"planned economy" was dropped from the platform in favor of
a "social market economy" in line with the CDU. The more
extreme elements of the party broke away, leaving a moderate
l09David P. Conradt, Unified Germany at the Polls: Political
Parties and the 1990 Federal Election, German Issues 9, American
Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1992, p. 2.
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leadership which envisioned social change for the working
class through small incremental victories.
The "Grand Coalition" between the CDU and the SPD from
1965 to 1969 helped change the image of the SPD. Instead of
a radical party of revolution and socialism, the SPD became
a mass party, working for all Germans on important issues.
With interest in preserving the democratic order, the SPD
demonstrated to the German people that it was an established
party, concerned with and responsible for national needs.
The CDU's relative decline, economic difficulty, and the
new image of the SPD, gave the Socialists their chance in
1969 to finally lead Germany. In coalition with the FDP,
the SPD broke 15 years of CDU\CSU domination. The
importance of this event can not be overstressed. Clearly,
democracy proved it could work in Germany; the voters had
two relatively balanced parties to chose from. For the
supporters of the SPD, the victory reenforced their
commitment to the party, thus alleviating possible
resentment towards the political system. Experiencing the
burden and satisfaction of governing, the SPD fully joined
the process instead of remaining outside. This was a major
step towards reconciling the political differences between
the working class and the middle class.
The FDP has enjoyed more power than its size would
suggest. Since 1949, the Party has been represented in 14
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of 17 cabinets formed. llo Never receiving more than 13
percent of the vote, the FDP has not won a seat by candidate
since 1957. The "double" vote, Land lists have kept the
party alive. In the tradition of Germany's past liberal
parties, the FDP has emphasized civil liberties, education,
and foreign and defense policy. The FDP tends to lean
towards the SPD on these issues. On economic and trade
related concerns however, the FDP is more in line with the
CDU. Support for the FDP mainly comes from the Protestant
middle class. Political scientist, David Conradt refers to
the FDP loyalist as the "well-educated, affluent voter who
wants a liberal corrective to the 'socialism' of the SPD and
the 'clericalism' of the CDU."l1l
Uniquely positioned between the CDU and the SPD, the FDP
has allowed the two major parties to govern without
compromising their positions regarding each other. This has
avoided possible political deadlock and crises. With its
strong commitment to democracy, the FDP has played a
significant role in bringing political stability to West
Germany.
The fourth party to have longevity and a strong core of
supporters is the CSU of Bavaria. A predominately regional
party, the CSU represents Catholic and Bavarian interests.




new Federal Republic of Germany, Bavaria retained most of
its pre-war territory, culture, and with the dismemberment
of Prussia, became the most powerful state in the
federation. Considered the sister party of the CDU, the CSU
has maintained a great deal of autonomy. Although
differences between the CDU and the CSU have arisen, both
parties remain close.
Under the long, stable rule of Franz-Joseph Strauss, the
CSU dominated Bavarian politics from the 1950s until his
death in 1988. 112 This was a major blow to the party, but it
has continued to do well. Concerned with losing relative
power in the CDU coalition and the Bundestag as a result of
unification, the CSU has branched out into the new eastern
states, especially Saxony, where it has helped found the
German Social Union (DSU). Conservative and nationalistic
in perspective, the CSU has fostered high technology
industry in Bavaria, and has used its position in the CDU
coalition to promote Bavarian interests. A strong, "well-
organized mass-membership party," the CSU represents
sectionalism in Germany.113 This could pose a problem in the
future if the major parties splinter into regional parties,
thereby making coalition building difficult.
112Russell J. Dalton, Politics in Germany, 2nd ed. (Irvine:
Harper Collins College Publishers, 1993), pp. 288-289.
113David P. Conradt, Unified Germany at the Polls, p. 10.
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With the German political scene coalesced around the CDU
and SPD, and their "minor" partners CSU and the FDP, only a
couple of other parties have broken the five percent
barrier. They did not last long, however. Starting in the
1980s though, the political landscape began to splinter with
the emergence of the Greens, the Republikaner, and the
German Peoples Union.
Every decade since the end of the Second World War has
had an outbreak of right-wing extremism in West Germany.
The cyclical trend of the economy appears to be connected to
the political changes witnessed. Perhaps memories of the
Weimar years, or the economic chaos following the war, have
left many Germans paranoid about their financial situation.
Whenever the economic situation has worsened the coalitions
have changed and the fringe parties have surged in
popularity. The economy is not the only driving force,
social change resulting from the continued industrialization
has also played an important part.
C. SOCIAL CHANGE
The pace of industrialization slowed in most parts of
West Germany. Those areas which remained largely
agricultural before the war, experienced the economic
transformation. Bavaria is an example. In 1950, 30 percent
of the work force was in agriculture; by 1985, this number
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had dropped to eight percent,114 as heavy industry and high
technology became dominant.
Urbanization accompanied the industrialization.
Refugees, immigrants, and young people looking for work,
poured into West Germany's major cities. Unlike Wilhelmine
Germany and the Weimar Republic, those who could not find
work were protected by a growing welfare system. The social
tensions resulting from greater urbanization were thus
diffused by a more pro-active national government. The
slower pace of industrialization and urbanization also
helped.
During West Germany's 45 years of existence, the
government worked closely with the financial and industrial
leaders to overcome economic difficulties quickly, and to
soften the blows of recession. Avoiding the debilitating
effects of an economic depression was paramount. This
cooperation worked well. The impact of recessions was
minimized, and inflation was kept under control during
periods of growth. Labor and industry agreed on mutually
beneficial policies. Real wages for blue collar workers
reached all-time highs, and opportunities for social
mobility increased as old barriers began to fade. 115 Class
114Rohe, Elections, Parties and Political Traditions, p. 157.
11SWolfgang Glatzer, Karl Otto Hondrich, Heinz-Herbert Noll,
Karin Stiehr, and Barbara Woendl, Recent Social Trends in West
Germany, 1960-1990, (Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press,
1992), p. 200.
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consciousness still existed in West Germany, but not as it
did before the Second World War.
The advancement of consumerism also helped break down
old class distinctions and build new ones. Status has
always been tied to wealth. The modern signs of affluence
range from the cars people drive to the clothes they wear.
Automobiles and their super highways, public transportation,
and airlines have offered greater mobility to society at
large. Consequently, most younger West Germans developed
more cosmopolitan views. Their education and exposure to a
bigger Germany, Europe and world, fostered international
thinking. In the process, sectionalism eroded. Regional
and cultural differences within Germany still existed,
however, they were not as divisive as they were during the
Weimar Republic.
Modernization changed attitudes towards women and their
role in society. The Nazi regime rejected the trend of
women in the work place until the demands of the war forced
them to rely on women to replace the men who were off
fighting. Still, the Nazis tried to meet the needs of
wartime industry with slave labor. After the war, many
women had to take the lead in providing for the family. The
loss of millions of young men to the war, pushed the
modernizing trend faster. Some women argued that social
equality had not been obtained, and that old attitudes
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persisted. 116 The changes in the past forty-five years were
still notable.
Religion was another "victim" of modernization. As a
unifying and dividing force of German politics, its
importance waned. In 1953, three-quarters of the CDU's
voters regularly practiced their religion, over one-half of
them being Catholics. 117 By the mid-1980s, this number had
fallen to one-third. 118 As in other aspects of social
change, there were still signs of religion's importance in
German society and politics. The potential for a resurgence
in religious support existed, especially as a dividing line
between christianity and other religions. The trend could
not be ignored, however, that the importance of religion as
a political basis of support was declining.
There were other signs of social change. The "cultural
revolution" of the 1960s ushered in a decade moralism,
radicalism, and artistic expression. 119 The peace and
environmental movements, anti-establishment attitudes, and
student demonstrations were all a part of the new generation
of West Germans who did not associate with the decades of
116Ibl'd, 106p. .
117Rohe, Elections, Parties and Political Traditions, p. 196.
118Ibid.
119Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West
Germany: Democracy and Its Discontents, 1963-1991, Vo. II, 2nd
ed. (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers', 1993), p. 67.
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rebuilding and sacrifice. 120 The leftist-oriented media
helped sound the call for social and political change.
During the late 1960s and the 197.0s, under the
leadership of the Social Democrats, West Germany entered a
new era of foreign policy, termed Ostpolitik (Eastern
politics). Concerned with easing tensions between the two
halves of Germany and with the Soviet Union, SPD Chancellor
Willy Brandt sought to engage in dialogue with the east, by
accepting the legitimacy of the German Democratic Republic
(GDR). This marked a major change in West German foreign
policy. Adenauer and the CDU had followed the course of
unification through strength and alliance with the west.
This change in foreign policy is indicative of the SPD's
mandate for change. Welfare expenditures and health care
costs soared during the SPD's years in power, reflecting the
SPD's concerns for the working class.
Many of the social changes discussed grew out of the
maturing of an industrial modern society. One example is
the pollution associated with advanced industrialization.
Technology and education have brought these problems to
light, and the mass media has galvanized public opinion to
confront the issues. The social tensions resulting from
industrialization and urbanization continued to pose a
challenge for democracy. West Germany's political system
120Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West
Germany, p. 70.
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has proved resilient, however. Capable of change and
responsive to the needs of the masses, the political process
kept the majority of people franchised. Those who felt they
were outside the system tended to support the extremist
parties. Their numbers were minimized by government
involvement in labor disputes and the growing welfare
protection.
West German democracy never had to face several
converging forces of change at one time as had the hapless
Weimar Republic did. The pace of change slowed and was
uneven after the Second World War. Population growth,
urbanization and industrialization all continued at
different speeds in different regions. The Ruhr, pre-war
industrial heartland, did not see much change. Bavaria on
the other hand, was transformed from an agricultural state
to one of high technology and heavy industry. One of the
strengths of democracy is the ability to adapt to change.
Federal and state governments became responsive to the needs
of the people caught up in the pressures of societal change.
The slackened pace of change, the conditioning of society to
the acceptance of modernization, and the growing
capabilities of government in dealing with social pressures,
all worked to diffuse the potential for political crises.
Social change creates fertile ground for political
extremism. There is a direct relation between the two.
Political extremism's appeal increases when the societal
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dislocations are greater. People who hold extreme political
views, be they left or right, can always be found. In
modern societies their numbers are usually small. Danger
arises when more moderate people feel compelled to side with
the extremists. Germany's political past supports this
assertion. Electoral success generally depends on taking
advantage of a crisis. The support gained is socially
divergent, and quickly fades unless the conditions for
success continue.
D. RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM
The focus in this section is on the right-wing of West
German politics. The terms "far right" and "extreme right"
are used to describe the entire spectrum in between. Other
words, such as ultra, and radical can replace extreme. As
political parties, the radical right has not enjoyed much
success. Except for periodic surges in support, the far
right has remained obscure. From 1949 to 1980, the trend
was towards political consolidation. Parties other than the
CDU, CSU, SPD, and FDP steadily lost support.
In 1949, 27.8 percent of the Federal electoral vote went
to parties other than the main four. By 1980, the "other"
parties received an all time low of only 0.5 percent of the
total. The far right has done better in certain state
elections and in the European parliament than in the Federal
elections. Part of the reason are regional differences.
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Before going into the history of the extreme right, a
discussion of how nationalism's role in politics has changed
is necessary.
The Second World War and the Nazi dictatorship left the
Germans little about which to be proud. Nationalism and
racism led to the murder of millions of innocent men, women,
and children, and the most destructive war yet known to
mankind. The old Pan-German nationalistic ideas were
thoroughly discredited. Notions of racial superiority and
dreams of a greater Germanic Empire ended in the
dismemberment of Germany and the heavy moral burden of the
terrible crimes committed. Most Germans have felt awkward
since about displaying any patriotic or nationalistic
sentiments. Those who have remained loyal to nationalistic
ideals have either attempted to revise the historical
interpretations of the Nazi era, or they have distanced
themselves from the past.
The majority of nationalists has focused on the
reunification of Germany; some have looked to the return of
lost territories. Only the most extreme groups aspired have
to world power. The question of how to reunite Germany
fractured the right-wing. Debates on the issue were
somewhat reminiscent of those discussed earlier about German
unification before 1871.
Since 1945, there were four main arguments regarding
reunification. One called for better relations with the
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Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, hopefully leading to an
agreement on the issue. u1 The second called for closer
Western ties and achieving unification through strength.
The third envisioned a stronger Europe, free from American
and Russian domination, which would set its own terms for
the "German Question". A fourth resembled the third,
however it leaned towards Germany renouncing the east and
west, and adopting a strong neutral position. 122 Within each
argument their existed disagreements over issues of timing,
relations with other countries, and the use of military
force. As a result, all attempts to unite the right-wing
spectrum failed.
Five right-wing parties are examined in detail. There
have been many more, but these five gained the most
notoriety. None has have ever enjoyed much success in the
Federal elections. Minor surges occurred during periods of
real or perceived crises. Any gains made were quickly lost.
Some scholars suggest that the far right has undergone a
transformation over the 41 years of West German democracy.123
This is debatable. Arguably, only the tactics and issues
have changed. The underlying objectives and the leadership
remain tied with the past.
121Richard Stoess, Politics Against Democracy: Right-Wing
Extremism in West Germany, translated by Lindsay Batson (New




The Socialist Party of the Reich (SRP), founded on
October 2, 1949, by Dr. Fritz DorIs, was a splinter from the
German Rights Party (DReP) .124 After some notable successes
such as the receipt of 11 percent" of the 1951 Lower Saxony
Landtag vote, the Party was banned by the Federal
Constitutional Court in 1952, 125for its direct link with the
NSDAP.
The German Rights Party later became the German Reich
Party (DRP). Many SRP members joined the DRP after the SRP
was banned. The DRP descended from the old German National
People's Party (DNVP). Following the First World War, the
DNVP was formed with the merging of the old conservative
parties, discussed earlier. This conservative element
survived the many years of change and turbulence, and was
not greatly affected by the infusion of many ex-Nazis.
Wishing to avoid trouble with Federal Constitutional
Court, the DRP refrained from setting forth clear political
agenda. A return to the monarchial or an authoritarian
order was certainly desired. The success of the CDU led
coalition in the 1950s drained most support away from the
DRP. In 1949, the DRP held five seats in the Bundestag. By
1961, the party could not win more than 0.8 percent of the
federal vote. The only momentary success came in 1959 in
124David Childs, "The Far Right in Germany since 1945," Neo-
Fascism in Europe, ed. Luciano Cheles, Ronnie Ferguson, and----
Michalina Vaughan (New York: Longman Inc., 1991), p. 71.
125Ibid.
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the state election for Rhineland-Palatinate, when the DRP
gained 5.1 percent of the vote. One year after the founding
of the National Democratic Party of Germany, the DRP
disbanded itself in 1965. Most of its members joined the
NPD.
On November 28, 1964, a new right-wing party was formed,
the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). Its
founders hoped to revive the far right by rallying all of
the nationalistic parties and groups under its banner.
Economic difficulties and the "Grand Coalition" between the
SPD and the CDU in 1966 gave the party a boost in the
federal election, but it still failed to receive more than
five percent. In state elections the NPD fared much better,
winning sixty seats out of 849 in seven states between 1966
and 1968. 126 After 1969, all far right parties lost support
and fell into obscurity for a decade. 127
The Verfassungsschutz (Bureau of investigation for the
protection of the Constitution) published a report citing
several reasons why it believed the NPD failed. Some of the
reasons given were: 128
-factional fights within party
-improved economic conditions
-the fact that there was a limited number of people responsive to
126Ibid, p. 73.
127Ibid.
128Ibl'd, 72 73pp. - .
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the right-wing exploitation of prejudice and emotion
-the increasing radicalization of the political style of the right-
wing extremists, which was rejected in more conservative circles
-the lack of tangible parliamentary successes by the representatives
of the NPD in local and regional parliaments
The Verfassungsschutz classified the NPD as neo-Nazi, though
the party tried to distance itself from this image. The NPD





rmany's role in the world
Nazi regime in order to
present the far right in a better light.
The failings of the NPD marked the beginning of a low
point for the far right. Extreme nationalists clinging to
the nostalgia of Nazism had lost touch with mainstream West
Germany. Relegated to obscurity, the far right went from a
high of 36,800 members in 1968 to a low of 17,300 in 1975. 130
Most former supporters joined the CDU and CSU during their
years of opposition against the social/liberal coalition.
Not until the CDU, CSU, and FDP came to power in 1982 did
the situation begin to turn around.
With the conservative parties back in power, the
unifying force of opposition was gone. Once again, there
was room for disagreement on the political right. In




phase of development. The social ramifications of post-
industrialization, coupled with an increase in immigration
has, built fertile ground for the far right to work.
One of the parties to capitalize on the changing
circumstances was the German People's Union (DVM). Founded
by Dr. Gerhard Frey in 1971, the original DVU remained a
non-party organization. Frey gave financial support to the
NPD, and concentrated on. the publishing of right-wing
material. By 1987, Frey announced the creation of a DVU
party, 'Deutsche Volkliste,' or Liste D, separate from the
non-party DVM. The regular DVM claimed over 12,000 members
in 1987. 131 The DVM Liste D was reported to have 2,500
members that same year.
The NPD never disappeared entirely.' In the 1987 federal
election it nearly doubled its support from 0.23 percent in
1983 to 0.6 percent in ten state lists with over 227,000
votes. Insignificant on the West German political scene,
the NPD and the DVM Liste D competed for a small percentage
of the voters. Not until a new party, the Republikaner,
carne onto the scene in the 1989 elections was it really
clear that right-wing support was swelling.
Franz Schoenhuber, a former television journalist who
served in the SS, helped found the Republikaner (REP) in
1983. Since then he became the leader of the party. In
1989 the REP gained six seats in the European parliament
131Stoess, Politics Against Democracy, p. 196.
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with 7.1 percent of the vote. 132 The West Berlin election of
1989 alarmed many when the REP won 7.5 percent of the votes.
In all other federal and state elections from 1987 until
reunification, the REP did poorly. Nonetheless, the 1989
results were the first far right successes since the late
1960s.
The REP has portrayed itself as a party between the
conservative CDU\CSU and the extreme right-wing.
Schoenhuber has made public statements denouncing National
Socialism. In addition, the party claims that, "No one may
become a member the party DIE REPUBLIKANER who belongs to or
supports an unconstitutional organization or a left-wing or
right-wing extremist group."ln Focusing on the
reunification of Germany, the increase in immigration,
education, and social problems, the REP has tried to avoid
contact with the more extreme right. Yet, rhetoric about
"asylum-seekers," and the media's alleged abuse of the
freedom of speech, along with views on NATO and
reunification, classified the party as on the edge of
extremism. Though the Verfassungsschutz declared the party
within the constitution, many including the SPD, have called
for a closer examination.
All of the extreme right-wing parties and organizations




thoroughly examined. In 1987 there were 69 right-wing
groups, including parties. 134 Though the parties
demonstrated some limited success, they still remained very
fractured among themselves. The leaders of the DVM and the
REP, the two most successful political parties on the far
right, wanted nothing to do with each other.
Further to the extreme right were the militant neo-
Nazis. Many did not hide their support for National
Socialism. Neo-Nazi skinheads instigated numerous street
fights and terrorist activities. From 1977 until 1988 there
were an average of 23 militant groups with about 57 members
each. 135 Right-wing violence escalated steadily from 136
acts in 1974 to 2,475 in 1982. 136 There was a drop in crimes
from 1982 until 1986, when the number started to rise once
again to just under 1,500 in 1987. 137 The rising trend of
violence continued right up until reunification. The next
chapter will revisit this issue and address extreme right
activities after German unification.
A broad analysis of the West German political right
would start with the CDU, which has right of center and far
D4David Childs, "The Far Right in Germany since 1945," Neo-
Fascism in Europe, p. 77.
135Christopher T. Husbands, "Militant Neo-Nazis in the
Federal Republic of Germany in the 1980s," in Neo-Fascism in
Europe, p. 91.
136Stoess, Politics Against Democracy, p. 167.
137David Childs, "The Far Right in Germany since 1945," Neo-
Fascism in Europe, p. 82.
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right members. The CSU would come next, slightly more ,right
than the CDU. On the far right would be the REP. Next,
entering the extreme right is the DVM Liste D. A little
further is the NPD. Finally, there are the militant neo-
Nazis.
Within the neo-Nazi arena there are different strands of
National Socialism. The Strasserite branch has broken away
from the traditional neo-Nazis, committed to Hitler's
version. The Strasser brothers and men like Ernst Roehm,
leader of the "Stormtroopers," believed in a complete
revolution of society, destroying all vestiges of the
bourgeois world. The new proponents of National Socialism
claim that Hitler sold out the movement to capitalists,
bureaucrats, and the middle class.
This gives an idea of where the different political
parties fit in relation to each other; it also demonstrates
how fractured the right is. This is not to say that it
cannot unite. A basic goal of many rightists is the
creation of a solid nationalist front. Differences within
the right and the lack of a powerful, charismatic leader,
have been the major problems so far.
The information presented demonstrates that the rise in
right-wing violence and political support began well before
reunification on October 3, 1990. German unification
certainly brought new challenges to democracy, however, it
is not the root of Germany's problems. These new
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difficulties will be discussed in the next chapter, but
first it is important to explore the causes of the right-
wing resurgence before unification.
E. POST-INDUSTRIALIZATION
The signs of post-industrialization are clear in most
Western European countries, the United States, and Japan.
The social and economic dislocations in West Germany which
led to a rise in rightist tendencies before unification,
were the result of this new phase in societal development.
Part of post-industrialization is the dawning of the
information revolution, advanced consumerism and global
economic interdependence at the highest level.
An avalanche of revolutions is occurring, if one is to
believe all the headlines. The "New Industrial Revolution,"
the "Military Technological Revolution," or MTR for the
technocrats, or the "Technological Revolution," separate
from the military, the "Information Revolution," are terms
used to describe the flood of change. This is not the place
to debate whether these are all truly revolutionary or not.
What is important is the fact that incredible change is all
around, forcing people to re-examine their lives and the
world.
The section on social change was in the past tense,
dealing with the continued forces of the old Industrial
Revolution, which really took off in Germany during the
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1880s to the 1890s. It was seen how this revolution caused
severe strains on the Wilhelmine society and how the Weimar
Republic confronted the challenges unsuccessfully, leading
to the Nazi state. The destruction of Third Reich left two
Germanies, both forced to deal with the same issues which
began before the turn of the century.
The Federal Republic of Germany has successfully dealt
with the problems associated with industrialization in the
past. Now there are new challenges from the move towards
post-industrialization. A loose term used to cover the
gambit of revolutionary changes. This is the nature of
human development. Just when we figure out how to solve the
problems which accompany advancement, we advance again.
Politics have always lagged behind social and economic
advance.
One of the difficulties of dealing with change cf this
nature is the gradual and uneven pace at which it proceeds.
While governments begin to confront this new challenge to
stability, they still have to address tensions resulting
from the past. This intersection between the old and the
new is always extremely difficult to navigate. Sometimes
governments turn to adventurism or nationalism in order to
divert attention from the domestic problems. Europe before
the First World War, and specifically Germany, are good
examples.
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There are many facets to post-industrialization. Only
some of them will be covered in order to convey the enormity
and complexity of this phenomenon and its social impact.
One of the most important trends is the increase in
automation and robotics, which is replacing humans in many
fields of manufacturing and routine work. 138 In 1980 there
were 1,255 industrial robots installed in West Germany. By
1989 this number reached 22,395. 139 In order to compete with
cheap labor in less developed countries, German firms are
forced to automate or move their businesses to other
regions. Either way, the German worker is affected. Forced
to take wage cuts, move into service jobs, or retrain for
another career, are the prospects for many German workers.
All choices are difficult and socially disruptive.
If the trend is slow, then the government can help by
offering assistance for new job training. Over the past few
decades the trends have been rather slow. The percentage of
people employed in the primary sector, agriculture,
forestry, and mining, went from 25 percent in 1950 to five
percent in 1987. 140 The percentage of people employed in
manufacturing went from nearly 50 percent in 1965 to 40
percent in 1987. The service sector has shown dramatic
138paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, (New
York: Vintage Books, 1993), p. 89.
139Recent Social Trends, p. 168.
14oIbid, p. 162.
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change, from thirty-two percent in 1950 to fifty-four
percent in 1987. 141 Indications are that the decline in
manufacturing and the increase in service jobs are
accelerating. With a growing government debt, and more
people needing support, will the demands be met?
Another competitor for government funds are the older
generations which are approaching retirement age. Two world
wars have left their mark demographically; moreover,
advanced industrialization has been accompanied by a decline
in the birth rate to near zero. With people living longer,
and retiring at a younger age, the demands on the state's
welfare system are rapidly growing. By the year 2000, 25
percent of the population will be 60 or older. 142 Even with
the current turn around in a positive birth rate, Germany
will face a decade or more of fiscal problems confronting
this issue.
Advanced consumerism is leading to new modes of
production. More and more people will be able to specify
design features desired in products tailored to individual
tastes. People are interacting with design and production
specialists as never before. Will this lead to a greater
sense of individuality? Will the trend continue into the
political arena, where common people will give inputs into
141Ibid, p. 164.
142Michael Mertes, "Germany's Social and Political Culture,"
Daedalus, (Winter 1994): 13.
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the decision making process? Does this mean a revolution in
the way governments operate? There are no answers to these
questions, only more uncertainty as to the impact on society
and politics.
Computers, satellites and advanced communications have
produced an information explosion. World-wide information
networks give anyone with a computer unprecedented access to
data. Ideas, technology, and knowledge pass from one side
of the globe to the other at a dizzying pace, frequently
beyond government control. The impact of mass media on
society and politics in the 1890s was enormous. It was
effectively used for enlightenment and for enslavement to
mould people's opinions. Modern technology has the same
potentials, only on a greater scale.
Another benefit from the Information Revolution is the
mobility of capital. Electronic transaction now occur seven
days a week 24 hours a day, crossing international
boundaries around the world. 143 The global investment pool
is larger than many state's GNP. The speed at which
investments can leave a country has limited the flexibility
of state governments, and left them fearful of the economic
consequences. 144 The globalization of national economies has
changed the way the world does business.
143Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, p. 123.
144Ibid, p. 129.
97
Though corporate names live on, they are now
multinational organizations loosely connected for certain
business ventures. 145 The names represent powerful marketing
tools, used for the sake of familiarity. For example,
Chrysler Motor Corporation only produced thirty percent of
the value of its cars in 1990. 146 The same trend applies to
German corporations, such as BMW, Volkswagen and Siemens.
Large national corporations are disappearing, therefore
economic competition between states has become more than
out-producing and out selling one another; it is about
attracting businesses and investment into one's country.
The education of a skilled work force, the building of
advanced transportation infrastructures, and the maintenance
a stable social and political environment are the keys to
future economic competitiveness. 147
There are other indications of an ever faster changing
world. The macro-trends discussed merely highlight a
fraction of the ongoing changes. Some in German society
have taken advantage of the new opportunities and are
profiting nicely. Others have are being left behind,
bewildered, anxious, and longing for the "better years" of
the past. These trends began to impact West German society
145Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations, (New York: Vintage




in the mid 1980s. The once esteemed and envied West German
"social market" economy was losing its edge. An Economist
article stated:
Observers, especially outside of Germany, began to see the
country not as a new model but as the best example of a
crumbling corporatism whose high-cost perfectionism was
unsuited to a new world of low-cost international competition.
The welfare state was feeling the strains of post-
industrialization, as were most other western democracies,
as 1990 approached.
Before West German politicians could respond to the new
challenges, the Cold War ended. The question of German
unification came to the fore, and after 45 years Germany
became one state again. A truly significant historical
event, reunification overshadowed the structural problems
which some West Germans were only starting to recognize.
The process of bringing two opposite societies together is
posing a major challenge for Germany. In order to
appreciate the difficulty, an understanding of East German
developments is necessary.
F. EAST GERMANY
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was founded on
October 7, 1949, in response to the Federal Republic of
Germany, founded in the west on May 23, 1949. Under the
shadow of the Soviet Union, the GDR became a communist
country modeled after Stalin's rule. The Socialist Unity
Party (SED), led by Walter Ulbricht, was the only political
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party allowed. Styling himself after Stalin, Ulbricht ruled
with a heavy hand until 1971. A worker's revolt in Berlin
and other major cities erupted in 1953, and was ruthlessly
suppressed by Soviet troops and tanks.
The flood of East Germans to the West resulted in a
serious crisis for the communist regime. Between 1945 to
1961 over two million Germans fled the east, prompting the
GDR to build a wall around West Berlin In 1961. The borders
were well guarded and police were ordered to shoot anyone
trying to escape. Still some people braved the dangers;
many made it to the west, others died trying. Most East
Germans resigned themselves to living in a police state and
quietly accepted their plight.
In 1971 Ulbricht was replaced by Erich Honecker as Party
leader. Many hoped for sweeping ,reforms, but were
disappointed. Honecker did ease the states intrusiveness,
however. Limited economic success, relaxed control over
private lives, and a general improvement in living standards
helped many tolerate the regime. Able to watch West German
television programs, the East German people dreamed of life
on the other side.
Honecker attempted to increase living standards through
the production of more consumer goods and construction. His
plan was successful to a degree, however, the expense became
a burden on the government. Without adequate incentives,
the East German people became apathetic towards work. Lack
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of competition acted as a drag on the economy. Stagnation
was a serious national security dilemma. By the 1980s, the
East German infrastructure desperately needed help. Roads,
bridges, communications systems, housing, and factories were
all deteriorating. Though some argue that the East German
regime could have gone on indefinitely had it not been for
external events, the decay and economic crisis suggest that
the end was approaching ..
For all the negative aspects of socialism, the East
German people did not worry about having a job, and basic
needs were met. There was law and order. For the people of
East Germany, making the transition to a liberal democracy,
where the values are completely different, is difficult at
best. The younger, less indoctrinated in socialism, will
likely find the transition easier, if they can find work.
Security and stability are missed by many of the older
generations. Life in democracies is about toleration and
compromises, opportunities and dangers. Ever since Hitler
came to power in 1933, those Germans living in the east have
only known authoritarian rule. Those 57 years have left
their mark on the East Germans.
When the winds of change swept through eastern Europe in
1989, the GDR was not ready. A rigid state, focused on
imprisoning its people, proved incapable of responding to
the rapid chain of events which began with the Hungarian
decision to lower the country's border restrictions.
101
Immediately, East Germans by the tens of thousands began
pouring into Hungary and on to West Germany. The beginning
of the end for the GDR had occurred. Appreciating the
enormous differences between living in a free society and a
police state is essential to grasping the complexity of
integrating two peoples into one state.
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v. CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE: 1990->
For this analysis the formal process of German
reunification is not as important here as are the
ramifications. So far this thesis has looked at the
historical problems of united Germany's political stability.
The signs of a "New Industrial Revolution" in West German
surfaced before unification, and have continued to the
present. In addition, both halves of Germany must confront
the challenge of building a common heritage and overcoming
the cultural differences of the past 45 years. This task is
the greatest for Germany since the end of the Second World
War.
There are numerous other difficulties, many of which
have been wrongly blamed on reunification. Massive
immigration from eastern Europe and war torn Yugoslavia has
led to social tensions and racial violence. The end of the
Cold War allowed the reunification of Germany, but it has
also placed a new Germany in the awkward position of
redefining its foreign policy. As a world economic power,
Germany is expected to play a larger role in international
affairs. Yet, Germany has the political difficulty of
asserting itself because of the Nazi past. In addition, the
world began entering a global recession in the late 1980s,
exacerbating the Federal Republic's economic difficulties
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with unification. These are some of the divergent
challenges facing Germany today. Still, unification proves
to be the most difficult obstacle to stability.
A. REUNIFICATION
The "two plus four talks," between the two Germanies,
the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and
France led to the signing of the "Unification Treaty" on
August 31, 1990. Unification took place on October 3,
1990. 148 In a blur the German Democratic Republic was gone.
The laws and currency of the Federal Republic of Germany
were brought to the east German states. West German
Chanc~llor Helmut Kohl (CDU) pushed ahead on unification
ignoring the criticism and concerns of many people. The SPD
wanted to slow the process down and carefully consider each
step. Kohl sensed the moment for turning back was gone, the
opportunity was fleeting. Promising that unification would
not hurt West Germany, Kohl convinced many of his countrymen
to support his policy.
German historians of the future should praise the
decisiveness and courage of Helmut Kohl. Until then he
faces harsh criticism from sections Germany society for his
14BNote: for more information on unification, please see;
Gert-Joachim Glaessner, and Ian Wallace, ed., The German
Revolution of 1989, (Providence: Berg Publishers, 1992).
Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall, Germany's Road to
Unification, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1993).
Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994).
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government's policies. Unification has been painful for
most Germans, east and west. The extent of decay in east
Germany and the costs of rebuilding were completely
underestimated. Since 1990, unification has cost the
government about DM 180 billion a year .149 This equals one-
half of Germany's annual tax revenues. 150 Currently, the
government spends 52 percent of the gross domestic product
(GDP). Before unification it was 45 percent. The
government debt has grown to OM 1.5 trillion, making
interest payments the largest share of the pUblic budget. 151
Social spending has soared in recent years. In 1950, 27
percent of the federal budget went to social programs; today
it has reached 47 percent. 152 The social budget rose 12
percent between 1991 and 1992, 7.7 percent for western
Germany, and 39.9 percent for the east. 153 In 1992, old-age
pensions cost OM 290.9 billion, health insurance OM 210.4
billion, disability insurance OM 16.7 billion, and labor
assistance DM 110.5 billion .154





153FBIS-WEU-93-125, 1 July 1993, p. 21.
154Ibid.
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Paying for these social programs has forced the
government to raise taxes in tpe west. Income taxes went up
7.S percent in July of 1991. 155 Further tax increases are
currently being debated, with Chancellor Kohl insisting that
this not be done before 1995, and the SPD calling for an
immediate increase. A fifty cent per gallon gasoline tax
went into effect in 1991 also. 156 Germany is already one of
the highest taxed countries in the world. 157 With the loss
of jobs, cuts in welfare, and increased taxes, animosity in
the west has risen. Germans in the west refer to the east
Germans as Jammer-Ossi (wailing easterners) .158 Hardening of
attitudes is only adding to the difficult tasks of uniting
Germany.
The shock of unification has dashed the hopes and
expectations of many east Germans. Having been promised the
living standards of the west overnight, the easterners feel
betrayed. 159 A common slogan is 'Verraten und Verkauft, ,
(deceived and sold). 160 This epi tomi zes the disenchantment
155Donald S. Kellerman, The Pulse of Europe, Sec. III, (Time
Mirror Center for the People and Press, 1992), p. 100.
156Ibid.
157"A Survey of Germany: Model Vision," The Economist, p. 7.
158FBIS-WEU-93-173, 9 September 1993, p. 34, from Der
Spiegel, Hamburg, 23 Aug 93, pp 24-27.
159Mary Fulbrook, "Nation, State, and Political Culture in
Divided Germany," in The State of Germany, p. 195.
16°"Growing Weight of Germany's Unification," New York Times,
8 March 1993, C:1.
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of the east. Wages have only made it to 65 percent of those
in the west, and Kohl has argued for a reversal, while
unions want as high as eighty-two percent. 161 With a
population of just under 16 million, the east Germans have
lost 4.4 million jobs since unification. Many easterners
view their western cousins with contempt, using the slang
Besser-Wessi (know-it-alls) .162 The federal elections this
year will likely reflect,this dissatisfaction in the east
with the Kohl government.
The prognosis for the future is not as poor as many
believe. Though unemployment is high for Germany, over four
million, there are signs of economic growth. 163 Government
social spending is decreasing. Increased taxes will help
cut the growing deficit and debt. The shock is over, people
are resigning themselves for a long road towards recovery.
Government, business, and labor leaders appreciate the
structural problems which must be addressed.
Unfortunately, with an election year at hand, many are
shying away from the hard decisions, and are blaming the
opposition for the difficulties. If the political scene
becomes too fractured, then coalition building may prove
challenging. Overcoming the obstacles to stability and
161Ibid, c: 3.
1~FBIS-WEU-93-l73, 9 September 1993, p. 34.
163"A Survey of Germany: Model Vision," The Economist, p. 34.
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future prosperity will require strong leadership and
teamwork.
B. IMMIGRATION AND RACIAL VIOLENCE
Not since the end of the Second World War have so many
people been on the move in Europe. Germany, the border
state between economic despair in the east and prosperity in
the west, is especially troubled with the influx of
immigrants. The tidal wave began in 1987, when 86,000
ethnic Germans returned from eastern Europe. This was twice
as many as the year before. A staggering 397,073 re-
settlers arrived in 1990. A total of 1.5 million ethnic
Germans migrated to Germany between 1987 and 1992. 164
In addition, hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers
have sought refuge since 1989. Germany has taken in more
immigrants than all of Europe combined. In 1991, 256,112
asylum seekers entered Germany. The number jumped to over
438,000 in 1992. 165 Declining to 322,000 in 1993, the
numbers are still enormous. 166 Most asylum seekers are
economic vice political refugees. Nonetheless, the German
government must process each individual. Meanwhile they are
given free room and board, social security benefits, and
164German Information Center, Press Release, June 1993.
165Alasdair Stewart, Migrants, Minorities, and Security in
Europe, Conflict Studies 252, Research Institute for the Study of
Conflict and Terrorism, 1992, p 7.
166FBIS-WEU, 5 January 1994, p. 6.
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work permits. The processing time has generally taken
between eight months to four years, however, the government
has taken steps to speed it up. Though 80 to 90 percent of
applicants are denied asylum, the logistics of sending them
back to their countries of origin have proven extremely
difficult. Agreements with Romania, Poland, and other
eastern European states have helped the situation.
On December 6, 1992, the government coalition and SPD
agreed to legislation limiting immigration. May 1993
witnessed the passing of an amendment to the German asylum
laws. The new laws made important distinctions between
victims of war, political persecution, and economic
deprivation. Immigrants coming to Germany through a "third
safe country," are to be denied access. Provisions were
also made for faster processing times.
All of these measures have helped, but people are still
pouring into Germany illegally. Many denied asylum have
stayed anyway. With the economic recession, higher taxes,
and the burden of unification, many Germans have turned on
the Auslaender. The far right has played on people's fears
blaming the asylum seekers for Germany's troubles. Sixty-
two percent of Germans polled believe there are too many
foreigners in Germany, up from 43 in 1991. Perceptions have
twisted reality causing great anxiety.
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Michael Burleigh suggests that German perceptions of the
east have always been mixed;
The German mission to bring civilization and order to the
Slavs was gradually given a biological accent in the form of
the slogan 'Drang nach Osten,' . whereby the Germans were
somehow compelled to venture eastwards. Since by the late
nineteenth century this notion was wildly at variance with a
general demographic drift westwards, the perception grew that
the Germans were holding back an uncontrollable Slavic flood
or wave. The East as a literary and historical construct was
thus simultaneously a land of opportunity and demographic
menace, notions which have endured to the Qresent time. 167
Businesses certainly view the east as a land of opportunity,
but the average German citizen believes the "Slavic horde"
is threatening to overrun their country. Manipulators of
fear are capitalizing on this anxiety.
Neo-Nazis and other extreme right-wing racists have
targeted the foreigners, including the few million Turkish
guest workers. Most Turks have lived in Germany for years;
some have been born in Germany. They have taken the jobs
that most Germans did not want. The violence is not really
over jobs though; it is about racism. Right-wing
politicians are using the fear of foreigners as a weapon to
mobilize support. In this case perceptions are more
important than reality.
The rise in racial violence corresponds with the
increase of immigrants into Germany. The number of right-
wing violent incidents rocketed from 128 in 1990 to 780 in
1991. After the government crack-down on extremists, the
167Michael Burleigh, "Scholarship, State, and Nation," in The
German State, p. 130.
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number dropped from 2,366 in 1992, to about 1,699 in 1993. 1"
Most offenders, about 70 percent, are less than 20 years
old; their social backgrounds are very diverse. The
majority of violent acts is perpetrated by males. Eighteen
percent are unemployed. A higher than average number of
offenders includes "workers or salaried employees."
Education levels are predominantly low to median. Only 37
percent of suspects in western Germany belong to an extreme
right-wing organization; in east Germany, the percentage is
19. 169
The organization and national coordination of these
numerous extremist groups are limited. On the local level,
they are small and disciplined. When organizations are
banned, the members found a new one or join another similar
group. The police crack-down has brought the divergent
groups closer together. Sophisticated computer networks has
aided in communicating and hiding from the authorities. 170
Recent attempts to found a unified national front have
failed. As long as the social and economic conditions
168FBIS-WEU- 93-2 36, 10 December, 1993, p. 27, "Right-Wing
Extremist Violence Declines," in Hamburg Bild, 8 December 1993,
p. 2. ----
169Note: all violence demographics from:
Press Release, 29 July 1993, "Offenders Do Not Fit
Typical Profiles," San Francisco, Ca., Consulate General's
Office.
l7oFBIS-WEU-93-243, 21 December 1993, p. 24, "Neo-Nazis Use
Telekom BTX for Propaganda," in Berlin Berliner Zeitung, 15
December 1993, p. 4.
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persist, then the appeal of extremist organizatio~s will
continue to rise, even with greater efforts of the police to
break them up.
C. POLITICS IN A NEW GERMANY
The fracturing of the political scene before unification
has already been covered. The CDU and SPD are still the
most powerful parties. The CSU and FDP continue to play
crucial roles. Yet, the rise of the Greens, the
Republicans, and the DVM, is being overshadowed by the
multitude of other parties that have emerged since
unification. Even if many of these parties do not make the
five percent hurdle, they will drain votes away from the
established parties. This could make coalition building
difficult. With the problems facing Germany, the last thing
needed is a weak coalition, unable to pass important
legislation.
The SED of the old GDR has transformed itself into the
Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). In the first all-
German national election of 1990, the PDS only won 2.4
percent of the vote, but managed to gain 17 seats with the
help of a special law allowing a party access with five
percent in east or west Germany.171 The PDS will likely gain
171German Information Center, "The 1994 German Elections: An
Overview," New York: Press Release, December 1993, p. 4.
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more support this year in view of east German voter
dissatisfaction with the Kohl government.
There is a multitude of new and old smaller parties,
which do not represent a threat individually, but can as a
group. The demise of the GDR has led to the forming of the
German Social Union (DSU), the Buendnis '90 (Alliance '90),
and the Neues Forum (New Forum), to name a few. The DSU is
a sister party to the Bavarian CSU. Alliance '90 has merged
with the Greens. The New Forum is a grass roots party.
Little is written about its agenda.
Other parties have sprung up. Markus Wegner, former
member of the CDU, has founded the Statt Partei (Instead
Party) .172 He protested the candidate selection process.
His new party won 5.6 percent of the Hamburg state
election. 173 The question must be asked, whether the rise of
fringe parties will disrupt the political process, or if
they are merely a passing phenomenon?
The Greens, the Republikans, the PDS and the DVU have
shown staying power in state and local elections. The PDS
and Greens\ Alliance '90, even made it into the Bundestag in
1990. 174 In an article titled "Crisis or Change? On the






The successes of both left-wing libertarian, as well as
radical right-wing populistic parties, are perhaps the most
salient proof of the thesis that the party systems of the
modern Western democracies are currently undergoing a
fundamental process of transformation. This process is the
result of far-reaching social changes that are closely linked
with entry into the postindustrial modern age. And yet, it
would be precipitous to justify the resultant political
turbulences that mark the present-day image of the Western
democracies solely as the breakup of the traditional lines of
conflict. The successes of left-wing libertarian and radical
right-wing populistic parties are, at least in part, an
expression of a questioning of the traditional transmission of
political power, which has been dominated by an elite. 175
If this is a major transformation of the political scene,
there is no reason to believe the major parties cannot
adapt. The future is not written. Parties have changed
through the years, the SPD is an example.
When the first West German elections were held 14
different parties were represented in the Bundestag. After
four years of successful CDU leadership, the number dropped
considerably. In this current period of rapid social change
it is natural that the political scene will splinter.
Political impotence is a real danger if working coalitions
cannot be formed. However, Germany also has the ability to
overcome this period of turbulence. If a strong coalition
can be built after these elections, and the hard decisions
made, then German democracy may adjust to the strains of
post-industrialization. Success will depend on the actions
of ordinary people. German history has shown us how those
who supported democracy failed against those bent on its
1~FBIS-WEU-93-090-S, 12 May 1993, "Germany: Vote
Alienation," p. 10, from Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B1,l/93,
12 March 1993, pp 3-13.
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destruction. Today the number of people against democracy
is on the rise once again.
The extreme right has grown in recent years, beginning
before unification. The economic difficulties associated
with unification, and the wave of immigrants has given
impetus to the movement. The major parties and groups of
the extreme right are;
Name Profile status
DVM German People's extreme right active
Union List D, party
Rep The Republikaner extreme right active
NPD National Dem- oldest extreme active
ocratic Party of right party
Germany
DL German League for assembly of active
Nation and former Rep and
Homeland members of NPD
GdNF Community of neo-Nazi group active
Interests of the for refounding
New Front NSDAP & Fourth
Reich
DA German party-poli tical forbidden
Alternative arm of GdNF, December 1992
active in eastern
Germany
FAP Free German neo-Nazi group ban is called
Workers Party founded in for
Stuttgart
HNG Auxiliary very active, acts active













NF Nationalistic tight Nazi-cadre forbidden




NO National .primarily in forbidden
Offensive Bavaria & Saxony, December 1992
most members from
FAP
NB National Bloc neo-Nazi splinter forbidden
group from DA & June 1993
FAP
DKB German neo-Nazi group forbidden
Comradeship founded in December 1992
League Wilhelmshaven
HVD Homeland Loyal neo-Nazi group forbidden
Association of concentrated in June 1993
Germany Baden-Wurttemburg
Reproduced from Die TAGESZEITUNG, 25Aug93, p.3. '76
Once a group or party is banned, the leaders and members
either join another organization or found a new one
themselves. The government's crackdown has caused some
chaos in the right. As long as the government remains
committed to monitoring extreme rightist groups, and banning
those breaking the law, then the danger they pose will be
minimized.
Unfortunately, the extreme right has an effective
political weapon - terror. Intimidating people has always
been a part of the militant neo-Nazi agenda. Recently, an
article in a rightist magazine listed 250 names of
politicians, lawyers, journalists, teachers, social workers,
and business people, who stand in the way of the extreme
176FBIS-WEU-93-17 3, 9 September 1993
116
right's plans. 177 Compiling an extensive list such as this,
required regional cooperation among the many divergent
groups. Modern technology allows national networks,
information hotlines, and electronic mail boxes, giving the
radical right the power to coordinate actions nationally.178
Traditionally the extreme right has been fractured,
lacking a strong, charismatic leadership. This could
change. There are individuals who may succeed in unifying
the right. Ewald Althans, 28 years old, is the self
appointed director of his own German Youth Education
Program, and hopes to be the next leader of the extreme
right movement. The Chief of the Office for the Protection
of the Constitution has stated, "Germany's most dangerous,
modern, and revisionist youth group," is led by Althans, who
"has everything the others are lacking, he knows the entire
gamut of persuasion. "179 The liberal magazine Der Spiegel,
of Hamburg, claimed A1thans "could be the most dangerous
demagogue in the right-wing spectrum. "180
Since the age of thirteen, Althans has been groomed to
be the next Nazi leader. He has learned from Willi Kraemer,
special consultant to Joseph Goebbels, Hitler's Minister of
177"Hatred Rising," World Press Review, February 1994, Vo.
41, N. 2, pp.11,12, from Martin Klingst, "'Enemies' must be
,Elimina ted, ,,, Die Zei t, Hamburg.
178Ibid.
179FBIS-WEU, 15 May 1992, p. 15.
18oIbid.
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Propaganda, and Ernst Remer, former commander of the "Guard
Battalion Greater Germany." Althans has his own publishing
company and brings in enough money to help him organize his
neo-Nazi group. Althans prqphecizes, "Bolshevism is dead.
The capitalist United States will collapse in the next 10
years. Now the entire world is waiting for the gigantic
German power. ,,181
The state and federal elections in 1994 have generated a
great deal of speculation and anxiety about the future of
Germany's political system. The 1990 elections were a poor
showing for the extreme right. The REP's successes in the
1987 West Berlin election were lost, as it failed to win any
seats in united Berlin's election of December 1990. 182 In
Bavaria the REP won 4.9 percent of the vote, just missing
the five percent hurdle. 183 The 1991 Bremen state election
saw the DVM gain 6.2 percent of the vote and six seats. 184
Then the REP won 10.9 percent of the Baden-Wurttemburg
election in 1992, causing great consternation .185 A
181Ibid.






•traditionally strong CDU state, the CDU lost 9.4 percent
from their last election .186
In the elections since, neither the DVM or the REP have
had any success. A couple of elections gave the REP over
four percent of the vote, not enough for seats. The
European Parliament elections on June 12, 1994, were a major
setback for the REP. The seven percent won five years ago
fell to only four percent, forcing the party out of the
European Parliament.~7 The CDU won a great victory against
the predictions of polls, with forty percent of the vote
compared to the SPD's thirty-three percent. 18s Signs that
the economy is improving, and rejection of the racial
violence associated with the extreme right are attributed to
the CDU's success.
There are still major elections ahead in 1994. October
16, 1994 is the date for the Bundestag elections. 189 Until
then there are still five state elections, including
Bavaria. Polls before the European Parliament elections
showed the SPD ahead of the CDU, however, Helmut Kohl has
proven capable of coming from behind in the past. The
latest election results show the CDU doing well. A victory
186Ibid.
187"Conservative Parties Gain in European Vote," New York
Times, 13 June 1994, A:3,C1.
188Ibid.
189German Information Center, "The 1994 German Elections: An
Overview," p. 8.
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in the Bundestag elections like the European Parliament
would give the CDU a strong mandate. The concern is whether
its coalition partner will survive. The FDP lost all of its
seats in the European Parliament.l~
with whom would the CDU form a coalition? A "Grand
Coalition" with the SPD could be awkward and difficult.
Such other parties, as the Greens and PDS would be even more
troublesome. Another possibility is that the FDP will
survive and change coalitions, joining the SPD. The Greens
and PDS may even join if necessary to overcome the CDU and
CSU. The danger of the fringe parties, including the
extreme right, lies in fracturing the political scene to the
point where coalitions are difficult or impossible to hold
together. A strong showing for either of the major parties
is important for future stability, but the FDP's success or
failure will also playa decisive role.
190"Conservative Parties Gain in European Vote," New York




This story began with the unification of Germany in 1871
as the Second Reich, the creation of Chancellor Otto von
Bismarck through "Blood and Iron." It has ended with the
reunification of Germany after 45 years of forced
separation, through a bloodless revolution of the East
German people. As the new Federal Republic of Germany sets
out to build a new identity for all Germans, one is struck
by the enormous destruction and suffering which have
resulted from the past hundred years of German nation-
building.
Germany is not alone to face such a difficult past. Its
size, population, and industrial potential, however, have
caused great danger for other neighboring countries. Italy
followed a very similar path of development, but its
military capability never seriously threatened the world
order, while that of Germany did. Germany also stands out
for its institutionalized mass murder of millions. Perhaps
these points are why historians, political scientists, and
socialogists are so interested in Germany, as German
internal political developments have had grave consequences
for the world.
Germany has had an unfortunate modern past. The
industrial revolution hit the country hardest immediately
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after unification in 1871. Its monarchial institutions were
rigid and unwilling to face the political challenges
resulting from increased social tensions. Technological
advances brought mass media and tiansportation, making mass
politics possible. Ideas of nationalism and racism became
twisted for radical political goals. Communism threatened
to destroy the old order. A period of political crisis
evolved in which the consevative ruling elites were
incapable or unwilling to resolve. This was Wilhelmine
Germany on the eve of the First World War. The war would
only bring death to millions, and privation for tens of
millions, exacerbating the existing social problems in
Germany. Clearly Germany had reached an intersection where
the old was giving way to the new, but not without a
struggle.
Nearly one hundred years later Germany is once again
confronted with epoch change while attempting to deal with
the issues of unification. There is a parallel between the
Germany of the 1890s and Germany today. Fortunately, this
time Germany is governed by democracy, which is much more
adaptive to change than authoritarian monarchies. That is,
if they can address the true problems and work to build
political consensus.
The Weimar Republic's demise is instructional in how the
strengths of democracy can become its greatest weakness.
Instead of building consensus, the Republic bred division.
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The Federal Republic of Germany today has no resemblence to
the hapless Weimar Republic. For over forty years the West
German state built strong and lasting political institutions
which withstood the strains of change. The Weimar Republic
was founded under completely different circumstances, and
never had the crucial period of stability needed to
consolidate its power.
Many scholars are optimistic about the future of German
democracy. John Breuilly argues;
When one considers the problems Germany faced in 1945 and
compares them to the problems that it confronts now, and when
one thinks that the most basic componets of economic success
in developed economies are technology and what in economicjargon is known as 'human capital' - then the pessimism appears
misplaced. There will be problems in the short term, but
provided a sensible policy of infrastructure investment is
followed in the GDR areas. I would think these will be
overcome within the decade .191
Germany is certainly better prepared to deal with change now
than in any other time in history, however, the danger lies
in focusing too much on solving the problems with
unification and missing the growing challenges from post-
industrialization.
Even if the traditional parties win a major victory in
1994's Federal election, they will still have to prove that
they can adapt to the new forces of change. Global economic
trends and mass migration are placing enormous demands on
the political structures of the western world. When similar
forces acted on Germany at the turn of the century, its




political institutions proved inflexible. Nearly fifty
years of turmoil ensued contributing to two world wars, the
end of the European order, and the death of millions.
Hopefully, Germany and Europe will be spared a similar fate
this time. Only by addressing the root causes of social
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